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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
While corporate governance has received lots of attention in the academic economics and finance 
literature, board of directors’ committees (excluding audit committee) have not drawn the public 
eye. Even though, board member election is one of the most crucial ways for shareholders to affect 
how the company is managed, just a handful of studies have been conducted about the different 
methods of preparing and electing the directors. Since these ways vary from country to country it is 
no surprise that shareholders’ nomination boards, which are mainly used just in Scandinavia, have 
remained in the darkest shadows of academic literature. In 2015, the Finnish Corporate Governance 
Code was updated to include shareholders’ nomination boards as an equal alternative to the more 
common, within board nomination committees. After the inclusion, many companies have adopted 
shareholders’ nomination boards and at the end of 2016 already 41 listed firms used it in Helsinki 
stock exchange. Therefore, it is about the time to shed some academic light to shareholders’ 
nomination boards. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A unique dataset is hand collected to study shareholders’ nomination boards and their development 
in Finland. Main data sources are company annual and corporate governance reports. After a 
thorough descriptive analysis, two different methods are used to examine nomination boards. First, 
Poisson and negative binomial regression models are constructed to study whether changes in 
nomination boards’ nominators have an effect on the subsequent board member turnover. Then, an 
event study methodology is used to figure out evidences whether the ‘hit-and-run’ philosophy is in 
use in Finland. In ‘hit-and-run’ philosophy an investor buys large block of shares just before the 
holdings revision date to secure a seat in the shareholders’ nomination board. After that, she 
promotes new board member candidates that drive short-term value adding methods such as share 
repurchase plans or higher dividends. When the effect of the artificial short-term value creation is 
realized in the company stock, the agent collects the profit and moves on to next target. 
KEY FINDINGS 
The thesis is the first detailed documentation of the shareholders’ nomination boards in Finland. 
Firms that use nomination board are very different in size and come from various industries but 
have on average highly concentrated ownership among the largest owners. Similarly, the 
nomination authority is concentrated to the hands of few, mainly to government and large pension 
funds. In addition, changes in nominators have a statistically significant and positive effect on the 
following board member turnover. Finally, there exist no indication that ‘hit-and-run’ philosophy 
would be used in Finland. 
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Vaikka yritysten hallinnointitapaa on tutkittu laajasti sekä taloustieteen että rahoituksen saralla, 
hallitusten komiteat (tilintarkastuskomiteaa lukuun ottamatta) eivät ole saavuttaneet juurikaan 
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yllätys, että osakkeenomistajien nimitystoimikunnat, joita käytetään pääasiassa vain 
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yksityiskohtaisemmin osakkeenomistajien nimitystoimikuntia. 
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muutokset nimitystoimikuntien nimittäjissä seuraavan hallituksen jäsen muutosten määrään. 
Tämän jälkeen tapahtumatutkimus menetelmää hyväksikäyttäen tutkitaan, onko ylisuuria tuottoja 
tehtävissä osakeomistusten tarkastuspäivän ympärillä. Hypoteesiasettelussa ylisuurien tuottojen 
oletetaan juontavan juurensa aktivistisijoittajien tai muiden tahojen yrityksestä keinotekoisesti 
vaikuttaa, nimitystoimikuntia hyödyntäen, yrityksen arvostukseen. 
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1. Introduction 
The thesis is the first detailed attempt to describe shareholders’ nomination boards in Finland 
using unique hand collected sample. Although the corporate governance model have existed 
since 2004, there still are only a handful of academic papers handling shareholders’ nomination 
boards (e.g. Carlsson 2007; Johanson and Østergren 2010; Poulsen, Strand, and Thomsen 2010) 
and only one that focuses on the Finnish companies (see Viskari 2014). Therefore, the thesis is 
a pioneering attempt to study the corporate governance model that is more widely in use in 
Finland than ever before.  
Shareholder’s nomination boards are alternatives to the nomination committees that are formed 
among the company board of directors. Both of these groups main task is “to prepare matters 
pertaining to the appointment and remuneration of board of directors” (Finnish Securities 
Market Association, 2015). The difference is that shareholder’s nomination board “consists of 
the company’s largest shareholders or persons appointed by the largest shareholders” (ibid). 
Some Finnish public listed companies have adopted shareholders’ nomination boards already 
in 2004. Among the early adopters were Exel Composites Oyj, Fortum Oyj and Metso Oyj, and 
in 2016 there are 41 public listed companies (37 of them following the Finnish Corporate 
Governance Code) in the OMX Helsinki that are utilizing this corporate governance method. 
The research is carried out with Finnish data since the shareholders’ nomination boards are not 
widely used anywhere else than in Scandinavia. The same format for shareholders’ nomination 
boards is actually only in use in Sweden, where the election committees “valberedningar” have 
been part of the corporate governance code since 2004 (Code Group, 2004). To mitigate the 
impact of country specific features as well as differences in the corporate governance codes and 
guidelines from distorting the results, the study is limited only to Finnish companies. 
The recent two changes in the Finnish Corporate Governance Code, first in 2010 and then in 
2015, have driven the implementation of shareholders’ nomination boards, especially among 
smaller and non-government owned companies. The firms that use shareholders’ nomination 
board are very different in their size and come from various industries. A shared feature of these 
companies is that the ownership is highly concentrated among the largest owners, the largest 
three shareholders own on average 37% of all the votes. Similarly, the nomination power is 
concentrated in the hands of few since the three largest nominators; Keskinäinen Eläke-
vakuutusyhtiö Ilmarinen, Finnish Government, and Keskinäinen Työeläkevakuutusyhtiö 
Varma, have chosen more than half of all the nominees in the past. The largest ten nominators 
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measured by all-time nomination count consist of four pension funds, three private investment 
groups, the investment funds of Nordea Bank and OP Group, as well as the Finnish 
Government. 
Another finding of the study, which neither has been researched before, is that changes in 
shareholders’ nomination boards have a statistically significant effect on changes in the 
subsequent board of the company. The relationship is positive, meaning that the more there are 
changes in the nominators, the more there are also changes in the following board. Even after 
controlling for variables that previous literature has shown to have an effect on the board 
member turnover, and after robustness checks, this relationship remains positive and 
significant. Therefore, shareholders’ nomination boards seem to work as a corporate 
governance model as intended. The largest shareholders have the power to oversee and affect 
company management, indirectly via board member election process. Even though the largest 
shareholders often get the shareholders’ nomination board seats, it is possible for smaller 
owners to gather their votes together and that way get a seat to the nomination board. 
Additionally, the annual general meeting elects always the new board of directors so the 
minority shareholders have their saying even without having a seat in the nomination board. As 
stated by Poulsen, Strand, and Thomsen (2010), shareholders’ nomination boards work as 
vehicles that enable negotiated compromises between the minority and large shareholders. 
In addition to the thorough descriptive analysis of shareholders’ nomination boards, the thesis 
evaluates, with an event study approach, whether positive abnormal returns exist before the 
holdings revision dates1 of shareholders’ nomination boards in Finland. The intuition is that the 
largest shareholders compete to get their nominees into the board of directors. This competition, 
even though being totally unrelated to the company fundamentals, then drives the share price 
up and produces abnormal returns before the holdings revision date. One possible party whose 
behavior might have an effect on the share price just before the holdings revision date are the 
short-term activist investors. Carlsson (2007) states that in Sweden some short-term activists 
boost their ownerships at the time when the shareholders’ nomination boards are supposed to 
be constituted. By doing that, activists receive power in the nomination board and can promote 
board of directors’ candidates who will push the agenda of short-term value creation, through 
for instance higher dividends or share repurchases. Shortly after achieving their goal, the 
                                                 
1 On holdings revision dates, the share ownerships are evaluated and the largest shareholders, who get the right to 
nominate a member into the shareholders’ nomination board, are determined. These dates are predetermined and 
the Finnish Corporate Governance Code requires their disclosure. 
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investors cash-in the short-term value increase and move onto the next target (ibid). According 
to Carlsson, this kind of behavior is called the ‘hit-and-run’ philosophy. Since shareholders’ 
nomination boards enable this kind of disadvantageous behavior in the first place, it should be 
studied whether ‘hit-and-run’ philosophy is practiced also in Finland. 
To answer comprehensively to the research question four testable hypothesis were formed. The 
first hypothesis is a test for the positive abnormal returns before the holdings revision dates in 
general. In the second and third hypothesis, the thesis evaluates whether a change in the 
shareholders’ nomination board would lead to abnormal returns, or would the non-government 
ownership in companies that use the shareholders’ nomination board be a cause of positive 
abnormal returns before the holdings are revised. Finally, the last hypothesis is a combination 
of the second and third hypothesis, testing their joint effect.  
The results are relieving since none of the tests indicates that shareholders’ nomination boards 
would be exploited as a loophole for short-term gains. There was no evidence against the first 
three hypotheses, and they all remained valid. In the fourth hypothesis test, the results were 
inconsistent due to the statistically significant positive event day abnormal return and the 
negative cumulative abnormal returns before the event day. However, a further analysis of the 
ownership changes ruled out the possibility that the positive event day abnormal return would 
have been caused due to last minute trading by the largest shareholders. Another interesting 
finding of the thesis is that firms with shareholders’ nomination board appear to produce 
negative cumulative abnormal returns that are statistically significant around the holdings 
revision date in the medium-term (41 trading days’ event window). The result is 
counterintuitive since the negative cumulative abnormal returns become statistically significant 
even before the holdings revision dates, in some of the tests, indicating that shareholders are 
selling more shares just before the nomination board places are determined. One plausible 
explanation might be the highly concentrated ownership among the companies with 
shareholders nomination board, which leads to a situation where the minority shareholders 
might not give a hoot about the shareholders’ nomination board places in their investment 
decisions. 
The thesis is organized in such a way that the second chapter takes a look at the existing 
literature and explains the relation to that. In the third chapter, the data collection and formation 
processes are explained. The fourth chapter introduces the recent changes in the Finnish 
Corporate Governance Code, evaluates the shareholders’ nomination boards in Finland, and 
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models how changes in nominators affect changes in the subsequent board members. The fifth 
chapter is about the research question formation as well as laying out testable hypotheses. In 
the sixth chapter, different event study methodologies are introduced and the chosen method is 
explained in detail, while the following chapter presents the empirical results. Finally, the 
conclusions are drawn and the further research avenues are proposed in the last chapter. 
2. Relation to the existing literature 
Governance is a field of academic research that invokes interest from many different sciences 
including economics, sociology, psychology, politics etc. Corporate governance is a 
subcategory of the governance literature, with focus on economic entities and their governance. 
There are many various ways to define corporate governance, and one of the most cited is the 
one by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), “Corporate governance deals with the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”. 
Their definition is that corporate governance ensures the needed basis for efficient financial 
markets and as noted by Melgin (2016) it does not make a distinction between equity holders 
and creditors. Additionally Melgin (ibid) reports a very detailed introduction to theories of 
corporate governance, beginning from the agency theory and its roots, continuing to the changes 
and additions to the agency theory, and finally landing to alternative view to the agency theory 
such as stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson 1997) and behavioral approach 
(Huse 2007). 
While the theories of corporate governance have attracted a lot of interest among the researchers 
there remain many undiscovered subjects in the field of corporate governance. As one of them, 
shareholders’ nomination boards have not received that much attention in the academic research 
for the obvious reason that they are primarily used in the Scandinavian countries, mainly in 
Finland and Sweden. While other board committees have been studied since the mid-1990s in 
many researches, especially the audit committees have inspired multiple studies, the nomination 
committees as whole have been by far the least studied board committee (Kaczmarek and 
Nyuur, 2016). Therefore, this study is an attempt to widen the knowledge of the less researched 
part of the corporate governance literature. In addition, since the Finnish Corporate Governance 
Code changed in 2015 the topic of the study is current and should be devoted some more 
attention, at least in Finland.  
Most of the studies covering nomination committees have focused on the effect of nomination 
committees’ structure to the board of directors’ nominations. For example, Vafeas (1999) finds 
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that having a nomination committee will not influence the number of outsider directors 
appointed to the boards but instead can influence the independence of the chosen outside 
directors. Eminet and Guedri (2010) evaluate how the CEOs’ influence affects the nomination 
process and nominated members of the board of directors, concluding that independent 
nomination committees are capable of reducing the CEOs’ influence and appoint more directors 
that actively exercise control over managers. Baldenius, Melumad, and Meng (2013) divides 
the directors into monitoring and advisory categories, and finds out that if the board is 
nominated by shareholders they may assemble an adviser-heavy board to avoid CEO 
entrenchment. Contrary, if the CEO has the control over the nominations the board will more 
likely be monitor-heavy, constraining the empire-building of the CEO (ibid). 
According to Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve, and Hu (2006), companies that have implemented 
nomination committees are more likely to appoint more independent and foreign board 
members, while the same does not apply for the number of female directors. Furthermore, the 
existence of nomination committee is positively related to the degree of nationality diversity 
but has no association with the educational diversity (ibid). On the other hand, Kaczmarek, 
Kimino and Pye (2012) found out that the more females or foreigners in nomination committees 
the higher is the level of board gender and nationality diversity. Both of these studies used 
European data, UK and Swiss respectively. Johanson and Østergren (2010) compare the 
differences between Swedish and British board independence and conclude ways that local 
corporate governance principle setters can improve the regulative frameworks.  
The paper by Poulsen, Strand, and Thomsen (2010) evaluate the relationship between voting 
power and shareholder activism. They find out that the Swedish model of shareholders’ 
nomination boards increase shareholder activism. In addition, they emphasize that the 
nomination boards are vehicles that enable negotiated compromises between the small 
shareholders and controlling block holders. This is followed from the fact that, even though 
large shareholders most of the time dominate the nomination committee they still transparently 
elect the committee at the annual general meeting so that small shareholders would have their 
say in the matter (ibid). Additionally, small shareholders can organize themselves as a 
consortium and reach enough votes to capture a seat in the shareholders’ nomination board. 
In the Finnish context, the study by Viskari (2014) has been the most influential research, so 
far, related to the shareholders’ nomination boards. In her research, Viskari compares 55 
Finnish and 55 Swedish public companies, and finds out that the nomination method has a 
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remarkable effect on the overall board diversity. In more detail, the shareholder nominated 
boards have more likely higher age, gender, and nationality diversity. While Viskari makes a 
pioneering work in comparing shareholders’ nomination boards and nomination committees 
among the board of directors, her approach does not reveal much about the shareholders’ 
nomination boards in Finland. That is because she includes only seven Finnish firms that have 
shareholders’ nomination boards into her sample. Additionally, all of them are government 
owned companies.  
In the context of nomination committees and shareholders’ nomination boards, previous 
academic literature focuses mainly on the diversity of boards and comparing the corporate 
governance methods between different countries. On top of that and more related to the study 
in-hand there are researches about the determinants of board of directors. The paper by 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) gathers the main findings together. Noteworthy thing about 
these studies is that severe limitations for cross-sectional analysis of board structures are caused 
by joint-endogeneity issues, because any variable that is cross-sectionally related to the board 
composition is probably jointly determined with board composition (ibid). Nevertheless, cross-
sectional correlations seem to be robust throughout various samples and have been studied and 
reported by numerous papers, including but not limited to Weisbach (1988), Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988), and Denis and Sarin (1999). The consensus seems to be that companies with 
insider-dominated boards appear to be those that are “tightly held” i.e. where the founders are 
active and the CEO is a large owner. Contrary, more mature and larger companies, with 
scattered ownerships, have more likely professional management and outsiders as a majority in 
their boards. Finally, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) note that there are little evidence to point 
that board composition would have any cross-sectional relationship to firm performance. 
How the changes in a firm’s characteristics and performance influence the subsequent board 
composition, was studied by Hermalin and Weisbach (1988). Particularly, they were interested 
in the changes of inside directors and outside directors separately. The main findings were that 
poor firm performance increases the likelihood of insiders to leave the board and outsiders to 
join the board. Additionally, the CEO succession process appears to be tightly related with the 
board selection process. At the time when a CEO nears retirement, more inside directors join 
the board to compete for the next CEO nomination. On the other hand, right after a CEO change, 
more insiders have a tendency to leave the board, consistent with the hypothesis that they are 
the losing candidates of the “CEO race”. Finally, when a company leaves a product market, 
inside directors tend to depart the board while outside directors tend to join it. (ibid) Denis and 
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Sarin (1999) confirmed the findings of Hermalin and Weisbach, and concluded that large 
changes in the composition of boards happen after abnormally poor performance, corporate 
control threats, as well as around top executive changes. In contrast, firm-specific determinants 
such as firm size, variance of stock return, capital structure, and growth opportunities seem to 
have only a weak relation to the board composition and to changes in ownership. Denis and 
Sarin conclude that neither board structures or ownership of firms are as stable as is commonly 
believed. 
In her study, Viskari (2014) also evaluates whether the type of nomination committee (sub-
committee of board vs. shareholder nominated) has an effect on the director turnover. To my 
knowledge, this is the only attempt to research the matter, and her results point out that 
nomination committee type has no significant effect on the director turnover. Rather Viskari 
confirms the findings of previous literature that mostly CEO change, company performance 
(return on assets) and board size drive the turnover of directors (ibid). 
While shareholders’ nomination boards have remained in the shadows of the academic finance 
research, the event study methodology has been widely used in many finance and economics 
researches. In fact, the popularity of event studies have been so huge that there exists even a 
category of financial and econometric literature devoted to the research of event study 
approaches. The most influential researches in the field are the papers by Brown and Warner 
(1980, 1985) concluding that the simple methodologies based on market models perform well 
in many situations and under different conditions. They also provide examples how and where 
misuse of the methodologies can lead to false inferences. In addition, more recent papers by 
Binder (1998) and MacKinlay (1997) both introduce various event study methodologies and 
their possible pitfalls. 
3. Data 
The data collection task required a specification for shareholders’ nomination board since there 
are various alternatives how Finnish listed companies have been organizing the preparation of 
the nomination process of board of directors. The definition of shareholders’ nomination board 
in this thesis requires that there is a pre-defined specific holdings revision date, on which the 
share ownership of the largest shareholders are evaluated, and based on that the largest 
shareholders have right to nominate a person to the shareholders’ nomination board. 
Additionally, the Chairman of the board of directors or/and a nominee of board of directors can 
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be an advisory member of the shareholders’ nomination board, on top of the nominees 
nominated by the largest shareholders. 
In the data collection process I went through all the listed companies of the OMX Helsinki and 
figured out whether they have or have had a shareholders’ nomination board in place. There are 
overall 58 companies listed in the Helsinki stock exchange that report having a shareholders’ 
nomination board or similar “other arrangement”, where the majority owners are heard before 
the board nominations. Out of these 58 companies, 15 have organized their board of director 
nomination process using these “other arrangement”. An example of such a company is Orion 
Oyj, which has implemented a shareholders’ nomination committee that has a totally different 
structure than the rest of the companies2. Table 1 lists the companies that use “other 
arrangement” in their board of director nomination process, as well as shortly describes each 
arrangement. These companies are excluded from the empirical evaluation of this study mainly 
since they do not have pre-defined holdings revision dates in place, which was a feature of the 
shareholders’ nomination boards’ definition stated afore. 
Table 1. Companies with other arrangements for the board of directors nomination 
Company Description of the board of directors' nomination process 
eQ OYJ  
The largest shareholders of eQ Oyj, which represent more than half of the total votes, make a 
proposition of the board of directors candidates to the annual general meeting. 
HKSCAN OYJ 
The existing board of directors chooses three members to the nomination committee of HK Scan Oyj, 
which can be also chosen outside the board of directors. The CEO or other executive director cannot be 
a member of the nomination committee. 
IXONOS OYJ 
Ixonos Oyj does not have nomination committee due to the concentrated ownership of the firm. The 
largest shareholder Tremoko Oy chooses the board of directors. 
MARIMEKKO OYJ  
The annual general meeting chooses the board of directors. The proposal of board of directors is 
prepared by significant shareholders. 
MARTELA OYJ 
Shareholders who represent together more than 50% of the votes, present their proposition of the board 
of directors to the annual general meeting. 
OLVI OYJ  The proposal related to the board of directors is presented to the company by its significant shareholders. 
ORIOLA-KD OYJ 
The nomination committee of Oriola-KD Oyj prepares the proposal of the board of directors. The 
members of the nomination committee are chosen by the existing board of directors, and they can be 
outside the board. Before the committee members are chosen the largest 20 shareholders are gathered 
and their candidates for the nomination committee members are discussed.  
ORION OYJ Similar nomination committee as in Oriola-KD Oyj. 
PANOSTAJA OYJ 
The practice have been that the proposals of the board of directors are prepared by the shareholders who 
represent over 10% of the total votes. The Chairman of the board of directors helps in the preparation 
process, if needed. 
                                                 
2 For example, the shareholders’ nomination board of Orion Oyj does not have a holdings revision date since it 
only meets when necessary (Charter of the Nomination Committee, Orion Oyj 29th October 2015)  
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QPR SOFTWARE OYJ 
Significant shareholders prepare their proposition of board of directors. The Chairman of the board of 
directors gathers at least the three largest shareholders into the preparation process. 
RAISIO OYJ  Raisio Oyj has a nomination working group under the board of supervisors. 
SAGA FURS OYJ 
Nomination committee consist of the representatives of the board of directors and the most important 
shareholders, who all are fur producers and thus have a client-relationship to the firm. 
SANOMA OYJ 
Sanoma Oyj has not found nomintion committee. Instead, the largest shareholder or a group of largest 
shareholders can propose new members to the board of directors. 
TAKOMA OYJ 
Usually the proposition of the board of directors is made by the shareholders who represent over 10% of 
the company votes. 
WÄRTSILÄ OYJ ABP 
Nomination committee prepares the board of directors member proposal to the annual general meeting. 
If needed, also the largest shareholders are contacted and their candidates considered. The invitiation to 
the annual general meeting includes the board of directors proposition. In addition, the propositions of 
the shareholders who control over 10% of the votes are included into the invitation, if delivered on time. 
 
Among the 43 companies that has implemented a shareholders’ nomination board as that fulfils 
the definition, four companies: Nordea Bank AB, Sotkamo Silver AB, SSAB AB and Telia 
Company AB are following the Swedish corporate governance code. These companies are also 
restricted from the study, to avoid any differences between Swedish and Finnish corporate 
governance codes to distort the results.  
Additionally, Okmetic Oyj and Vacon Oyj were acquired before their initial revision dates were 
due, and hence are extracted from the study. In the case of Atria Oyj, all the shareholders that 
own KII-series shares have a right to nominate one person to the nomination board, and in 
addition the largest owner of A-series shares who does not own KII-series shares is granted the 
right to nominate one person to the board. The roots of Atria’s board of director’s nomination 
practice is based on the company’s historical structure as a co-operative. Only those parties that 
used to be members of the co-operative are holding KII-shares, which enables the company to 
focus the decision power to the hands of the antecedent co-operative members. Even though, 
Atria Oyj’s board of directors’ nomination process fulfils the definition of shareholder’s 
nomination board, the company is still excluded from the empirical study of this thesis due to 
its clear distinction to other shareholders’ nomination board selection criteria. 
After finding out which companies in Helsinki stock exchange have shareholders’ nomination 
board in place, the next step was to dig the holdings revision dates for each company separately. 
The dates for the holdings revision are required to be disclosed by the companies, which made 
the data collection a lot easier process. These dates were easily found from company 
announcements, financial and corporate governance reports except for few exceptions. For 
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Kemira Oyj the first two years’ (2004 and 2005) revision dates were unavailable, which was 
also the case for Uponor Oyj in 2008. The holdings revision dates and the year the shareholders’ 
nomination board was founded are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Founding year of the shareholders' nomination board and the number of holdings 
revision dates 
 Company Founding year Number of holdings revision dates 
1 AFFECTO OYJ 2015 2 
2 AHLSTROM OYJ 2013 4 
3 AKTIA PANKKI OYJ  2010 7 
4 ALMA MEDIA OYJ 2015 2 
5 ASIAKASTIETO GROUP OYJ 2015 2 
6 ASPO OYJ 2016 1 
7 ATRIA OYJ 2012 5 
8 BASWARE OYJ 2016 1 
9 COMPONENTA OYJ 2014 3 
10 CRAMO OYJ  2015 2 
11 DNA OYJ 2015 2 
12 ELISA OYJ  2013 5 
13 EXEL COMPOSITES OYJ 2005 12 
14 FINNAIR OYJ   2008 9 
15 FORTUM OYJ  2004 13 
16 GLASTON OYJ   2013 4 
17 KEMIRA OYJ 2004 11 
18 KESLA OYJ 2015 2 
19 METSO OYJ 2004 13 
20 MUNKSJÖ OYJ 2013 4 
21 NESTE OYJ 2005 12 
22 OUTOKUMPU OYJ  2005 12 
23 OUTOTEC OYJ 2012 5 
24 PKC GROUP OYJ  2016 1 
25 SPONDA OYJ 2004 13 
26 STOCKMANN OYJ ABP 2015 2 
27 STORA ENSO OYJ  2005 12 
28 SUOMEN HOIVATILAT OYJ 2016 1 
29 SUOMINEN OYJ 2011 6 
30 TALVIVAARAN KAIVOSOSAKEYHTIÖ OYJ 2013 4 
31 TECHNOPOLIS OYJ 2013 6 
32 TIETO OYJ 2010 7 
33 TIKKURILA OYJ 2010 7 
34 UPONOR OYJ 2008 8 
35 VALMET OYJ 2014 3 
36 YIT OYJ 2016 1 
37 ÅLANDSBANKEN ABP 2013 4 
  Total 208 
 
Besides finding the revision dates for each company, I needed also to collect the structure of 
those nomination boards (for year 2016 see Table 3) and their nominees. Utilizing the same 
sources that I used for the revision date collection I was able to find out the nominators and 
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nominees for each company, excluding Aktia Pankki Oyj in 2012 and 2013, and Exel 
Composites Oyj in 2007 and 2009. 
Table 3. Structure of the shareholders' nomination boards at the end of 2016 
The structure of the nomination board states the number of largest shareholders that have the nomination right 
 Company Structure of the nomination board (2016) 
1 AFFECTO OYJ 3 shareholders + CoB (if not representing shareholders) 
2 AHLSTROM OYJ 3 shareholders + CoB + Nominee of BoD 
3 AKTIA PANKKI OYJ  3 shareholders + CoBS 
4 ALMA MEDIA OYJ 4 shareholders + CoB 
5 ASIAKASTIETO GROUP OYJ 3 shareholders + CoB + Nominee of BoD 
6 ASPO OYJ 4 shareholders + CoB 
7 ATRIA OYJ All KI-shareholders + Largest A-shareholder + CoB 
8 BASWARE OYJ 3 shareholders + CoB 
9 COMPONENTA OYJ 3 shareholders + CoB 
10 CRAMO OYJ  3 shareholders + CoB 
11 DNA OYJ 3 shareholders 
12 ELISA OYJ  4 shareholders + CoB 
13 EXEL COMPOSITES OYJ 4 shareholders + CoB 
14 FINNAIR OYJ   3 shareholders + CoB 
15 FORTUM OYJ  3 shareholders + CoB 
16 GLASTON OYJ   4 shareholders + CoB 
17 KEMIRA OYJ 4 shareholders + CoB 
18 KESLA OYJ 2 shareholders + Nominee of nominees 
19 METSO OYJ 4 shareholders + CoB 
20 MUNKSJÖ OYJ 3 shareholders + CoB + Nominee of BoD 
21 NESTE OYJ 3 shareholders + CoB 
22 OUTOKUMPU OYJ  4 shareholders + CoB 
23 OUTOTEC OYJ 3 shareholders + CoB 
24 PKC GROUP OYJ  3 shareholders + CoB 
25 SPONDA OYJ 3 shareholders + CoB 
26 STOCKMANN OYJ ABP 4 shareholders + CoB 
27 STORA ENSO OYJ  2 shareholders + CoB + Vice CoB 
28 SUOMEN HOIVATILAT OYJ 3 shareholders + CoB 
29 SUOMINEN OYJ 3 shareholders + CoB 
30 TALVIVAARAN KAIVOSOSAKEYHTIÖ OYJ 4 shareholders + CoB + Nominee of BoD 
31 TECHNOPOLIS OYJ 3 shareholders + CoB 
32 TIETO OYJ 4 shareholders + CoB 
33 TIKKURILA OYJ 3 shareholders + CoB 
34 UPONOR OYJ 3 shareholders + CoB 
35 VALMET OYJ 4 shareholders + CoB 
36 YIT OYJ 3 shareholders + (CoB if invited) 
37 ÅLANDSBANKEN ABP 3 shareholders + CoB 
   
   
BoD = the board of directors  
CoB = Chairman of the board of directors  
CoBS = Chairman of the board of supervisors  
 
The daily share price data was extracted from Nasdaq Helsinki. For all the other holdings 
revision dates, the share price data was available except for DNA Oyj in 2015 and 2016, as well 
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as Munksjö Oyj in 2013 because those companies were not publicly listed at that time. 
Additionally, the trade of Talvivaara Oyj shares have been halted since the November 6 2014, 
which obviously makes the examination after the 2014 impossible. Other exclusions of some 
company-years have been done in the empirical study section if the share price data have not 
been sufficient for execution of certain estimation and event period lengths. As the source for 
OMX Helsinki index prices the Nasdaq Helsinki database was utilized. OMX Helsinki index 
(OMXHPI), including all the companies that are on the main list that, is used as the market 
return. These companies need to comply with the Finnish Corporate Governance code. 
Finally, the structure of board of directors and the member tenure was collected for each 
company that fulfilled the shareholders’ nomination board definition. The data was extracted 
from the annual reports and corporate governance reports, and is used in the analyzing how 
changes in nominators affect the director turnover. In addition, the data was enriched with CEO 
changes from company annual reports as well as earnings before interest and taxes, average 
total assets, and stock return. The performance measures were obtained from Orbis database 
and company annual reports, while stock returns were calculated using same daily return data 
as above.  
4. Shareholders’ nomination boards 
The purpose of shareholders’ nomination board is to provide an alternative to the preparation 
of proposal for the composition of the board of directors. In the past more common way to 
prepare the proposal for the next board of directors, has been by the existing board of directors 
or by a committee consisting of the members of board of directors. Additionally, some firms 
have used other not as organized and transparent ways to prepare the candidates for the 
subsequent board of directors.  
In Finland, the first shareholders’ nomination boards were introduced in 2004 by four 
government owned companies Fortum Oyj, Kemira Oyj, Metso Oyj, and Sponda Oyj. During 
the next year four other companies implemented the shareholders’ nomination board as well, 
among these companies Neste Oyj, Outokumpu Oyj, and Stora Enso Oyj were government 
owned, while Exel Composites Oyj was the first non-government owned company to use the 
shareholders’ nomination board. The largest shareholder of Exel Composites Oyj back in 2005 
was Nordstjernan AB, a Swedish investment company, which exposure to the Swedish 
corporate governance model probably influenced the implementation of the shareholders’ 
nomination board. After 2005, out of the listed companies only Finnair Oyj and Uponor Oyj 
13 
 
adopted the shareholders’ nomination board before the end of decade. The next wave of 
shareholders’ nomination board implementations took place after the change in the Finnish 
Corporate Governance Code in 2010, when the option of nomination board consisting of 
shareholders or their representatives was introduced (Finnish Securities Market Association, 
2010). During the following four years, 13 companies began to use shareholders’ nomination 
board, of which seven companies were non-government owned. Although the Finnish 
Corporate Governance Code is not strict but based on “comply or explain” principle, evidently 
the inclusion of shareholders’ nomination board as an alternative had huge impact on their 
implementation, especially among non-government owned companies. Proofed again after the 
most recent change in the Finnish Corporate Governance Code in 2015, already 12 new 
companies have implemented the shareholders’ nomination board. The recent change 
introduced the shareholders’ nomination board first time as an equal alternative to the 
nomination committee rather than being a sub-category of it. Also, the disclosure of the 
preparation process of board member candidates was streamlined for all the methods. Another 
noteworthy point is that none of the companies that have implemented shareholders’ 
nomination board has not changed back to their former corporate governance model. 
4.1. Change in the Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2015 
Electing the board of directors is one of the most important decisions made in the annual general 
meetings. Since there are multiple ways of how companies can arrange the preparation process 
of the candidates for the next board, a clear and transparent procedure is emphasized by the 
authorities. Hence, a new recommendation about “the Preparation of the Proposal for the 
Composition of the Board of Directors” was introduced in the latest Finnish Corporate 
Governance Code 2015. 
The previous Finnish Corporate Governance Code from 2010 did not require companies to 
disclose the procedure that they applied in the preparation of the candidates for the next board 
of directors, unless the nomination board consisted of shareholders or representatives of 
shareholders (Finnish Securities Market Association, 2010). Instead, the latest version of the 
Finnish Corporate Governance Code includes Recommendation 7: “The company shall disclose 
the procedure applied in the preparation process of the proposal for the composition of the board 
of directors” (Finnish Securities Market Association, 2015), which unifies the disclosure 
practice despite of the method of board members’ preparation.  
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The second significant change to the Finnish Corporate Governance Code was the introduction 
of shareholders’ nomination board as an alternative to the nomination committee. The new 
Recommendation 18b by Finnish Securities Market Association (2015) states that: 
The company’s general meeting may establish a shareholders’ nomination board to 
prepare matters pertaining to the appointment and remuneration of the board of 
directors. The shareholders’ nomination board shall consist of the company’s largest 
shareholders or persons appointed by the largest shareholders. The shareholders’ 
nomination board may also include members of the board of directors. 
Authorities emphasize the following of good corporate governance practices in the process for 
establishing the shareholders’ nomination board (ibid). The Finnish Corporate Governance 
Code requires reporting of the procedure and the cut-off date for determining the largest 
shareholders (holdings revision date), the procedure of appointing the members to the 
shareholders’ nomination board, as well as the members of nomination board and whose 
nominees they are (ibid). In addition, the term of office of the members and the information 
about the length of existence of the shareholders’ nomination board can be voluntarily reported. 
Similarly, to the nomination committees consisted of members of board of directors, the 
proposal for the candidates of the next board of directors has to be disclosed by the 
shareholders’ nomination board no later than in the notice of annual general meeting.  
The introduction of shareholders’ nomination board as an equal method of preparing the board 
of directors to the more traditional nomination committee, in the latest Finnish Corporate 
Governance Code has had a huge impact on the implementation of shareholders’ nomination 
boards. During the past few years, first time also smaller companies have been adopting the 
corporate governance method. 
4.2. Descriptive evaluation of shareholders’ nomination boards 
At the end of the year 2016, overall 41 companies listed on OMX Helsinki had adopted 
shareholders’ nomination board. Out of these companies, four followed the Swedish Corporate 
Governance Code and were thus excluded from the evaluation. The rest 37 companies came 
from various industries, were different in their size, and included both government and non-
government owned companies (see Table 4). The ownership seems to be concentrated to the 
largest shareholders, as the average ownership of the three largest shareholders is 36.7% of all 
the votes, among the sample companies. Additionally, in around a fifth of the companies the 
three largest shareholders have the controlling share of total votes. 
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In 2016, most shareholders’ nomination boards include the nominees of the three or four largest 
owners, in terms of the total votes, and the Chairman of the board of directors, while some 
companies introduce an additional member of board of directors. The construction company 
YIT Oyj lets the nominees of the shareholders’ nomination board to decide whether they invite 
the Chairman of the board of directors to the nomination board. DNA Oyj is the sole company 
that do not include the Chairman of the board of directors in the shareholders’ nomination 
board. Aktia Pankki Oyj does not have the Chairman of the board of directors in their 
shareholders’ nomination board but rather includes the Chairman of the board of supervisors 
instead. Two companies, Kesla Oyj and Stora Enso Oyj, rely the responsibility of nominating 
the shareholders’ nomination board nominees to the two largest shareholders. In both of these 
companies there are dual share class in use (Kesla Oyj has unlisted voting shares), and the two 
largest owners have together the majority control of votes. In Kesla Oyj’s case, the two 
nominees of the two largest shareholders choose an additional member to the shareholders’ 
nomination board, while Stora Enso Oyj adds the Vice Chairman of the board of directors to 
the nomination board.  
During the past 10 years, there has been some changes in the shareholders’ nomination board 
structures. Especially, the government owned companies have been seeking the shape of their 
nomination boards. In 2009, four government owned companies, Finnair Oyj, Fortum Oyj, 
Metso Oyj, and Neste Oyj, included the Vice Chairman of the board of directors as an advisory 
member to their shareholders’ nomination boards. This experiment was not a success and the 
next year, all the companies reversed the change. A successful change was made by another 
government owned company, Kemira Oyj, when it included the nominee of the fourth largest 
owner to the shareholders’ nomination board, back in 2009. Even until today, the shareholders’ 
nomination board of Kemira has remained in the same form. An example of a contrary action 
is Tikkurila Oyj whose annual general meeting decided to exclude the nominee of the fourth 
largest shareholder after the Finnish government (Solidium Oy) sold its stake in the company, 
in 2011. The most active firm to change its shareholders’ nomination board structure is the 
mining and stainless steel producer group, Outokumpu Oyj. First in 2009, the annual general 
meeting decided to change the fourth largest shareholder’s nomination right to a nominee of 
the board of directors who was then excluded from the nomination board the year after. The 
company continued with the three largest shareholders’ nominees and the Chairman of the 
board of directors in the shareholders’ nomination board until 2012, when the nomination right 
was reintroduced to the fourth largest shareholder. During the year 2012, Outotec Oyj, the spin- 
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Table 4. Company characteristics and ownership concentration for firms with shareholders’ nomination board 
 Company Industry 
Market Cap 
(mEUR) 
Total Assets 
(mEUR) 
Government 
owned (2016) 
Ownership concentration 
(largest 3 owners/all votes) 
1 AFFECTO OYJ Other software publishing 65 117  22.5 % 
2 AHLSTROM OYJ Manufacture of paper and paperboard 636 828  27.2 % 
3 AKTIA PANKKI OYJ  Other monetary intermediation 419 9,486  36.6 % 
4 ALMA MEDIA OYJ Printing of newspapers 421 327  56.4 % 
5 ASIAKASTIETO GROUP OYJ Other professional, scientific and technical activities nec 264 157  40.5 % 
6 ASPO OYJ Wholesale of chemical products 268 310  19.2 % 
7 ATRIA OYJ Processing and preserving of meat 214 909  61.3 % 
8 BASWARE OYJ Other software publishing 511 227  22.2 % 
9 COMPONENTA OYJ Casting of steel 29 402  31.4 % 
10 CRAMO OYJ  Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction 1,036 1,156  10.7 % 
11 DNA OYJ Other telecommunications activities 1,520 1,259  64.1 % 
12 ELISA OYJ  Other telecommunications activities 5,318 2,533 X 15.4 % 
13 EXEL COMPOSITES OYJ Manufacture of sports goods 60 53  39.9 % 
14 FINNAIR OYJ   Passenger air transport 621 2,529 X 63.3 % 
15 FORTUM OYJ  Production of electricity 11,824 21,964 X 52.5 % 
16 GLASTON OYJ   Manufacture of hollow glass 76 101  41.3 % 
17 KEMIRA OYJ Manufacture of other chemical products nec 1,828 2,621 X 40.1 % 
18 KESLA OYJ Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction 12 33  68.9 % 
19 METSO OYJ Manufacture of machinery for paper and paperboard production 4,913 3,236 X 31.6 % 
20 MUNKSJÖ OYJ Manufacture of machinery for paper and paperboard production 872 1,187  27.4 % 
21 NESTE OYJ Manufacture of refined petroleum products 9,254 7,443 X 53.1 % 
22 OUTOKUMPU OYJ  Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys 3,637 5,990 X 28.3 % 
23 OUTOTEC OYJ Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction 1,254 1,427 X 28.0 % 
24 PKC GROUP OYJ  Manufacture of electronic components 569 564  21.7 % 
25 SPONDA OYJ Activities of other membership organisations 1,381 3,917  46.7 % 
26 STOCKMANN OYJ ABP Other retail sale in non-specialised stores 330 2,241  39.1 % 
27 STORA ENSO OYJ  Manufacture of paper and paperboard 6,911 12,326 X 62.5 % 
28 SUOMEN HOIVATILAT OYJ Renting and operating of own or leased real estate 157 160  24.1 % 
29 SUOMINEN OYJ Manufacture of non-wovens and articles made from non-wovens, except apparel 253 316  45.5 % 
30 TALVIVAARA OYJ Mining of other non-ferrous metal ores 127 4 X 14.5 % 
31 TECHNOPOLIS OYJ Other professional, scientific and technical activities 491 1,825  37.0 % 
32 TIETO OYJ Other software publishing 2,085 1,075 X 27.2 % 
33 TIKKURILA OYJ Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and mastics 816 410  28.8 % 
34 UPONOR OYJ Manufacture of builders' ware of plastic 1,278 768  45.4 % 
35 VALMET OYJ Manufacture of machinery for paper and paperboard production 2,539 2,958 X 17.1 % 
36 YIT OYJ Construction of residential and non-residential buildings 934 2,284  17.0 % 
37 ÅLANDSBANKEN ABP Other monetary intermediation 122 5,137   49.3 % 
1
6
w
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off subsidiary of Outokumpu Oyj implemented shareholders’ nomination board that included 
the nominees of the three largest owners plus the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the board of 
directors. Also Outotec Oyj followed the former parent company’s example by removing the 
Vice Chairman of the board of directors from the nomination board in 2013. 
Besides the structure of shareholders’ nomination boards, different companies have distinct 
ways to act when a change occurs in the largest owners of the firm during the shareholders’ 
nomination terms. For instance, Talvivaara Oyj’s fourth largest shareholder Keskinäinen 
työeläkevakuutusyhtiö Varma had already nominated Mikko Koivusalo to the shareholders’ 
nomination board in 2013, before selling all of its holdings. After the ownership of Varma was 
not among the largest ten shareholders, Mikko Koivusalo resigned from the nomination board 
that decided not to name anyone to replace Koivusalo in the board. In a similar manner, Martin 
Oliw resigned from the shareholders’ nomination board of Valmet Oyj, after Cevian Capital 
Partners Ltd. sold its stake in the company during 2015, and no one was nominated to replace 
him. Two other companies, Finnair Oyj and Suominen Oyj, fulfilled the places of resigned 
members in their shareholders’ nomination board. In both cases, the largest shareholder who 
did not qualify to the nomination board on the previous holdings revision date nominated the 
new member.  
Another interesting aspect related to the shareholders’ nomination boards is that sometimes the 
largest shareholders do not use their nomination rights, which is then passed on to the next 
largest shareholder on the line. According to Carlsson (2007), some foreign institutional 
investors have chosen to stay off the nomination boards in Sweden. There are three occasions 
when this has happened also in Finland. First in 2006, Odin Norden did not use its nomination 
right for Metso Oyj, and then in 2015 and 2016 Lombard International Assurance S.A. did not 
appoint a member to shareholders’ nomination board of Affecto Oyj. These are not though the 
only times when some eligible party did not use its nomination right. Mandatum 
Henkivakuutusosakeyhtiö has used only once (in 2015 for Asiakastieto Oyj) the privilege to 
nominate, and passed the opportunity other five times (in 2008 and 2009 for Uponor Oyj, in 
2012 for Atria Oyj, and in 2016 for Asiakastieto Oyj). Additionally, Keskinäinen 
työeläkevakuutusyhtiö Varma did not use its nomination right in 2012 for Atria Oyj, Ahlström 
Oyj passed on the nomination right for Munksjö Oyj in 2014, and Nokian Eläkesäätiö as well 
as Valtion Eläkerahasto did not appoint for Sponda Oyj in 2004 and 2006, respectively. 
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It is difficult to speculate why some organizations do not want to use their nomination rights. 
Possible explanations might be that foreign investors experience the nomination right more as 
a burden rather than a benefit, and leave therefore their right unused. For Nokian Eläkesäätiö 
(“The pension foundation of Nokia”) it may have been easier to pass on the nomination right if 
there was no fulltime investment manager to make decisions. The case of the life insurance 
company, Mandatum Henkivakuutusosakeyhtiö is a bit confusing since the company invests in 
many Finnish companies but still do not want to actively influence the management by 
appointing the shareholders’ nomination board members. Compared to other Finnish pension 
funds and investment companies, Mandatum has chosen very passive strategy in their 
investment management through nominations. The decision of Valtion Eläkerahasto (“Finnish 
government pension fund”) to pass on the nomination right for Sponda Oyj in 2006 is also 
somewhat puzzling since they used their nomination right for the same firm the year before as 
well as a year after. Ahlström Oyj is the only listed company that has not used its nomination 
right in a given year. Although, the nomination right was not used for Munksjö Oyj in 2014 
Ahlström Oyj has appointed members to the shareholders’ nomination board of Suominen Oyj 
between 2011 and 2013. 
The holdings revision dates vary from company to company. For some companies the first or 
last weekday of a predefined month is the holdings revision date, while others use a fixed date 
from year to year. In addition, 15 companies have changed the holdings revision date from one  
Table 5. Changes in holdings revision dates 
The initial holdings revision date and new dates. If the date is written using numbers, it means a fixed date from year to year, while if it is written 
in letters the holdings are revised in the given weekday of that month. 
Company 
Initial 
Date 
New Date 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
EXEL COMPOSITES OYJ 15.11.  Nov. 1st       Oct. 1st   
FINNAIR OYJ   Nov. 1st        Sep. 1st    
FORTUM OYJ  1.12. Nov. 1st       Sep. 1st    
KEMIRA OYJ Nov. 1st   17.12. 31.5.  31.8.      
KESLA OYJ 16.2.           Feb. 28th 
METSO OYJ 1.12. Nov. 1st     1.10.  Aug. 31st Sep. 1st   
NESTE OYJ 1.12. Nov. 1st       Sep. 1st    
OUTOKUMPU OYJ  1.12. Nov. 1st     1.10.      
SPONDA OYJ 1.12. Nov. 1st     1.10.  30.9.    
STORA ENSO OYJ  1.10.     30.9.      31.8. 
SUOMINEN OYJ 17.11.       15.11. 1.9.    
TECHNOPOLIS OYJ 1.10.        1.9.    
TIETO OYJ 30.9.       31.8.     
TIKKURILA OYJ 31.8.       31.5.     
UPONOR OYJ 31.7.           31.8.           
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year to another, (all the changes are available in the Table 5). 
Again, the government owned companies have been busier in changing the holdings revision 
date than their non-government owned counterparts. Metso Oyj has managed to change the 
holdings revision date for four times, while Kemira Oyj and Sponda Oyj have made three 
changes each. A clear pattern is that in 2006 all government owned companies at that time 
changed simultaneously their holdings revision date for the first weekday of November.  
The nomination rights are very concentrated in Finland among the three largest nominators. 
These are two pension funds, Keskinäinen Eläkevakuutusyhtiö Ilmarinen and Keskinäinen 
Työeläkevakuutusyhtiö Varma, and the Finnish Government that consists of Solidium Oy, 
Valtioneuvoston kanslia and Kauppa- ja Teollisuusministeriö. Presented on the Table 6, the 
three largest nominators have named around 350 nominees to the shareholders’ nomination 
boards, which is more than half of the all nominees (around 680) named in total. Among the 
largest ten nominators of all time, there are four pension funds, three private investment groups 
and the investment funds of Nordea Bank and OP Group in addition to the Finnish Government.  
Table 6. Nominators with more than 5 nominees in total 
Company / Organization Nominees 
Keskinäinen Eläkevakuutusyhtiö Ilmarinen 120 
Finnish Government (Solidium Oy, VNK, Kauppa- Teollisuusministeriö) 117 
Keskinäinen Työeläkevakuutusyhtiö Varma 115 
Oras Invest Oy 26 
Kansaneläkelaitos 25 
Cevian Capital AB 20 
OP-Rahastoyhtiö 13 
Nordea Funds Oy 12 
AC Invest & Ahlström Oyj 11 
Kuntien eläkevakuutus 9 
Nordstjernan AB 9 
Foundation Asset Management 8 
Keskinäinen Eläkevakuutusyhtiö Etera 7 
Eläkevakuutusosakeyhtiö Veritas 6 
Oulun kaupunki 6 
Skagen Global Verdipapirfond 6 
Itikka Osuuskunta 5 
Lihakunta 5 
Pohjanmaan Liha 5 
Stiftelsen Tre Smeder 5 
Veikko Laine Oy 5 
Ålandia Vakuutus 5 
Total 540 
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In some occasions, a group of shareholders has established an alliance to reach the amount of 
shares required to the nomination right. In Ahlström Oyj this kind of practice has been used 
since 2014, when Vimpu Intessentar Ab and Belgrano Investments Oy formed an alliance to 
nominate Alexander Ehrnrooth into the shareholders’ nomination board. On the same year, five 
individual investors plus Ahlström Capital Oy also put their votes together to nominate Thomas 
Ahlström into the nomination board. These two coalitions have remained since and nominated 
every year the same persons into the nomination boards. Similar arrangement by the Ahlstöm 
family, Ahlstöm Capital Oy and a group of individual investors have been in use also in 
Munksjö Oyj since its spin-off from Ahlström Oyj in 2013.  
4.3. Changes in nomination boards and their relation to directors’ turnover 
Before studying whether abnormal returns exist around holdings revision dates the relation 
between changes in shareholders’ nomination board, especially in the nominators, and the board 
of directors’ turnover should be evaluated. The seat in the shareholders’ nomination board gives 
the permission and responsibility to prepare the next board candidates, of which the annual 
general meeting then votes and elects the subsequent board of directors. Therefore, a change in 
the nominators of shareholders’ nomination board should lead to more changes in the board of 
directors in the following annual general meeting assuming that the new nominators are trying 
to affect the management of that company. 
To study the effect of changes in shareholders’ nomination board to the directors’ turnover, a 
regression analysis is performed. Because the response variable in the analysis is not continuous 
but rather a count variable (the number of changes in the board of directors), ordinary least 
squares (OLS) would be inconsistent and biased as noted by Hermalin and Weisbach (1988). 
The solution is to use a Poisson loglinear model introduced by Hausman, Hall and Griliches 
(1984). The methodology is similar to the study by Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), except that 
instead figuring out how inside and outside directors tend to be nominated; the focus of this 
study is solely on the relationship between changes in nominators and the subsequent directors. 
Poisson loglinear model consists of three components (Agresti (2007)): 
1. Random component: the response variable has a Poisson distribution that is 
𝑦𝑖~𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝑢𝑖) for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 where the expected count of 𝑦𝑖 is 𝐸(𝑌) = 𝜇. 
2. Systematic component: Specifies the set of explanatory variables. 
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3. Link function: Specifies a function that relates 𝜇 to the linear predictor i.e. connects the 
random and systematic components. In the Poisson loglinear model, the link function 
permits 𝜇 to be nonlinearly related to the predictors, by modeling the log of the mean. 
As long as 𝜇 cannot be negative (as is the case with count data), the log link function is 
appropriate.  
With these three components, a Poisson loglinear model has form: 
log(𝜇) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘 
Since the Poisson distribution has a positive mean, it is possible to model the log of the mean, 
which can have any real-number value. The mean of the model satisfies the exponential 
relationship: 
𝜇 = exp(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥) = e𝛼(e𝛽1)
𝑥1
… (e𝛽𝑘)
𝑥𝑘
  
Therefore, the interpretation of the parameter estimates are following: 
- exp(𝛼) = effect of the mean of response variable, 𝜇, when 𝑋 = 0 
- exp(𝛽𝑘) = with every unit increase in 𝑥𝑘, the predictor variable has multiplicative effect 
of exp(𝛽𝑘) on the mean of response variable (𝜇) 
Instead of minimizing the sum of the squares, as OLS does, the Poisson loglinear model finds 
model parameter estimates using a numerical algorithm (ibid), such as Fisher scoring algorithm, 
Newton-Raphson algorithm, etc. In general, a closed-form solution does not exist so the 
maximum likelihood estimates calculated through the above-mentioned iterative algorithms. 
Agresti (2007) and Fisher (1925) provide a more detailed explanation about the methodology. 
When conducting a Poisson regression a thing to bear in mind is that by a definition, a random 
variable has the same mean and variance. Sometimes the data vary more than is assumed if the 
response distribution would truly be Poisson. When the random component of the Poisson 
regression has larger variance than mean we are facing a complication called overdispersion. 
Fortunately, overdispersion can be easily solved by using a different distribution called negative 
binomial, which has a form: 
𝐸(𝑌) = 𝜇, Var(𝑌) = 𝜇 + 𝐷𝜇2 
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Negative binomial distribution has a nonnegative dispersion parameter 𝐷 that adjust for the 
overdispersion as stated by Agresti (2007). In fact, negative binomial distribution converges to 
the Poisson distribution when 𝐷 → 0 i.e. when overdispersion is not present. 
Overall, there are 145 firm-years in the sample between 2005 and 2016. As mentioned earlier, 
the response variable in the Poisson loglinear model is the count of changes in board of directors 
at time 𝑡0, which are either additions or departures. Similar to the Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1988), there are no “adding-up constraints” in the data since the additions and departures from 
board are joint-equations. Although, there are in total 177 additions and 176 departures in the 
sample, the correlation between the additions and departures is only 0.786. This is an indication 
that the board size is not fixed as noted also by Hermalin and Weisbach (ibid). On an average 
firm-year there was 2.35 changes in the board of directors, while the most changes in one firm-
year was 11. Additionally, on some firm-years there was no changes in the board of directors. 
The explanatory variable of interest is the changes in the nominators of shareholders’ nominator 
board at time 𝑡−1. The mean changes in the nominators was 0.37 and the maximum amount of 
changes in a given year was 3.  
Other explanatory variables were chosen following the previous literature, especially Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1988) and Viskari (2014). The controlling explanatory variables include the size 
of the board of directors at 𝑡0 as well as the amount how much the size of the board of directors 
changed from the previous year. Intuitively, the larger the boards are – the more likely there is 
going to be changes in them. Moreover, by definition if there is a change in the size of the board 
– there must be at least one change in the directors. The effect of firm performance to director 
turnover is evaluated by the change in EBIT in the previous year as well as two years before 
the board of directors election. Similarly, the previous return on the company stock is included 
as two explanatory variables3. The effect of CEO change and directors closing to retirement 
were included in the model with two dummy variables. In addition, the board of directors 
median tenure is controlled by another explanatory variable, firm size (average total assets) and 
dummy variable indicating whether the nomination board was founded at year 𝑡0, are included 
in the model. Finally, year dummies for three periods: 2005-2008, 2009-2012, and 2013-2016 
are used to control for time trends. 
                                                 
3 For companies with dual share classes the equally weighted average return was used. 
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Table 7. Loglinear Poisson regression estimates of changes in the board of directors 
The estimates of changes in board of directors between 2005 and 2016 in companies that have implemented a 
shareholders’ nomination board. Data about board members and the nominators of shareholders’ nomination 
boards is hand collected from companies annual reports and corporate governance Reports for each of the 144 
firm-years. Financial data is obtained from Orbis -database and companies Annual Reports. Stock return data is 
extracted from Nasdaq.  
(Significance levels 10-% level *, 5-% level **, and 1-% level ***)  
  Independent variable Estimate Std. Error z-value Pr(>|z|)   
 Intercept -0.4607 0.4853 -0.9492 0.3425  
 lag(changes in nominator) a 0.2142 0.0947 2.2632 0.0236 ** 
 Board size 0.1915 0.0616 3.1063 0.0019 *** 
 Board size changed by b -0.1681 0.0930 -1.8075 0.0707 * 
 ΔEBIT c 0.0001 0.0002 0.3567 0.7213  
 lag(ΔEBIT) 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0892 0.9289  
 Stock return d -0.1470 0.1536 -0.9568 0.3387  
 lag(stock return) 0.0060 0.1414 0.0424 0.9662  
 Dummy CEO change e 0.1221 0.1482 0.8238 0.4101  
 Dummy over 65 years old directors -0.0469 0.1238 -0.3793 0.7045  
 lag(directors’ median tenure) -0.0166 0.0411 -0.4030 0.6870  
 Size f 0.0000 0.0000 -0.5778 0.5634  
 Dummy if year = 2009-2012 -0.0846 0.1858 -0.4555 0.6488  
 Dummy if year = 2013-2016 -0.0313 0.1786 -0.1751 0.8610  
  lag(dummy nomination board founded) g 0.0125 0.1790 0.0697 0.9444   
       
 Residual deviance: 215.8 on 130 degrees of freedom      
 
a lag(changes in nominator) is the number of changes in nominators of shareholders’ nomination boards 
in the previous year. 
 
 b Board size changed by is the number of seats the board size did change compared to the previous year.  
 c ΔEBIT is the company’s change in earnings before interest and taxes in the recent fiscal year.   
 
d Stock return is the return on the company stock during the most recent calendar (for companies with 
dual share classes stock return is the equally weighted average return. 
 
 e Dummy CEO change is indicating whether CEO changed during the most recent calendar year.  
 f Size is the average total assets during the most recent fiscal year.  
 
g lag(dummy nomination board founded) indicates whether the nomination board was founded the year 
before. 
 
 
The loglinear Poisson regression results are shown in Table 7. Since the coefficient for the 
explanatory variable of interest (lag(changes in nominator)) is positive, the more changes there 
were in nominators in the previous year 𝑡−1, the more changes there are in the board of directors 
in year 𝑡0. The estimate 0.2142, with standard error of 0.0947, is statistically significant at 5-% 
level.  Other statistically significant variables are the ones about board size. It appears so that 
the size of the board of directors at 𝑡0 is positively related to the number of changes in directors 
at the same year. As expected and verified by the previous literature, it seems so that the larger 
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the board, the more there are changes in directors. Additionally, there seems to be a negative 
relationship between the change in the board size and the changes in the directors. The 
coefficient is statistically significant at 10-% level, and it seems quite odd that the relationship 
would be negative. Contrary to previous literature neither; CEO change, previous company 
performance, or the number of directors nearing retirement seem to have statistically significant 
relationship with the director turnover. 
Overall, the model does not fit the data very well. In a loglinear Poisson regression model that 
fits the data satisfactory, the residual deviance should be equal to the number of degrees of 
freedom, which is the expected value of χ2 distribution. This is because residual deviance 
follows approximately χ2 distribution with (𝑛 − 𝑝) degrees of freedom, where 𝑝 states the 
number of unknown parameters in the model. Given the residual deviance value of 215.8 with 
130 degrees of freedom, it is visible that the model lacks the fit. This might be caused by the 
presence of overdispersion in the model. As mentioned earlier, the cure for overdispersion is to 
fit a model with negative binomial distribution instead of Poisson distribution. 
Otherwise, the model remains the same as with loglinear Poisson model, and only new estimates 
are fitted using the overdispersion robust negative binomial distribution. The coefficient for 
lag(changes in nominator) remains positive (see Table 8), but is not as statistically significant 
as in the previous model, with 𝑧-value of 0.5746. In addition, the coefficient for change in the 
size of board is no more statistically significant, and the odd relationship found in the loglinear 
Poisson model seem to have been due to overdispersion. Finally, the coefficient of size of the 
board of directors at 𝑡0 is still positive and becomes statistically significant at 0.1-% level. The 
overall fit of the model improves as well, as the residual deviance value decreases to 167.7 that 
is much closer to the degrees of freedom (130).  
The results of the regression analysis indicate that changes in nominators have a positive effect 
on the number of changes in the subsequent board of directors. Because, the more there are 
changes in nominators seem to increase the director turnover in the following year, the 
hypothesis that activist investors are using shareholders’ nomination boards to their self-
benefits is plausible and needs to be investigated in more detail. Additionally, the results for 
companies with shareholders’ nomination boards seem to deviate from the previous literature. 
The explanation might be that the more concentrated ownership affect the director turnover, in 
a way that it is less dependent on the short-term performance in the past and more focused on 
the longer-term performance. In addition, the retirement age from the board might be different 
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for companies with shareholders’ nomination boards, but as fruitful as an explanation that 
would be, it is out of the scope of this thesis. 
Table 8. Negative binomial regression estimates of changes in the board of directors 
The estimates of changes in board of directors between 2005 and 2016 in companies that have implemented a 
shareholders’ nomination board. Data about board members and the nominators of shareholders’ nomination 
boards is hand collected from companies Annual Reports and Corporate Governance Reports for each of the 144 
firm-years. Financial data is obtained from Orbis -database and companies Annual Reports. Stock return data is 
extracted from Nasdaq. 
(Significance levels 10-% level *, 5-% level **, and 1-% level ***) 
  Independent variable Estimate Std. Error z-value Pr(>|z|)   
 Intercept -1.0951 1.1646 -0.9403 0.3470 
 
 lag(changes in nominator) a 0.5368 0.2825 1.8998 0.0575 * 
 Board size 0.5069 0.1495 3.3916 0.0007 *** 
 Board size changed by b -0.3660 0.2607 -1.4037 0.1604 
 
 ΔEBIT c 0.0002 0.0006 0.2778 0.7812 
 
 lag(ΔEBIT) -0.0001 0.0006 -0.2461 0.8056 
 
 Stock return d -0.3002 0.3601 -0.8336 0.4045 
 
 lag(stock return) -0.0062 0.3753 -0.0165 0.9869 
 
 Dummy CEO change e 0.5127 0.4617 1.1103 0.2669 
 
 Dummy over 65 years old directors -0.0963 0.3127 -0.3080 0.7581 
 
 lag(directors’ median tenure) -0.0324 0.1008 -0.3218 0.7476 
 
 Size f 0.0000 0.0000 -0.4083 0.6830 
 
 Dummy if year = 2009-2012 -0.2808 0.4835 -0.5809 0.5613 
 
 Dummy if year = 2013-2016 -0.1099 0.4870 -0.2258 0.8214 
 
  lag(dummy nomination board founded) g -0.0160 0.4246 -0.0377 0.9699 
 
       
 Residual deviance: 167.7 on 130 degrees of freedom      
 Theta 
7.29 3.63    
 
a lag(changes in nominator) is the number of changes in nominators of shareholders’ nomination boards 
in the previous year. 
 
 b Board size changed by is the number of seats the board size did change compared to the previous year.  
 c ΔEBIT is the company’s change in earnings before interest and taxes in the recent fiscal year.   
 
d Stock return is the return on the company stock during the most recent calendar (for companies with 
dual share classes stock return is the equally weighted average return. 
 
 e Dummy CEO change is indicating whether CEO changed during the most recent calendar year.  
 f Size is the average total assets during the most recent fiscal year.  
 
g lag(dummy nomination board founded) indicates whether the nomination board was founded the year 
before. 
 
 
5. The research question and testable hypotheses 
This thesis is interested in shareholders’ nomination boards and particularly in the abnormal 
returns before the holdings revision date. There are some evidence from Sweden that short-term 
activist investors acquire shares before the holdings are revised to ensure their place in the 
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shareholders’ nomination board (Carlsson 2007). Once they have access to nominate board 
candidates, such a candidates will be promoted who are aligned with the interest of the activists, 
i.e. driving the short-term share value (possibly in an expense of the long-term value) via more 
leveraged capital structure or share repurchases (ibid). To succeed in their target the activist 
investors might need to buy very large junks of shares in a short time window just before the 
holdings revision date that may lead to positive abnormal returns before the event date. Since 
in Sweden the shareholders’ nomination boards have been a common corporate governance 
practice and included in the Corporate Governance code since 2004, there might be some parties 
also in Finland trying to influence company decision-making through the shareholders’ 
nomination boards. If this kind of activist behavior exist in Finland, changes that restrict the 
short-term exploitation would be recommendable to the Finnish Corporate Governance. 
Additionally, if there exist a pattern of abnormal returns before the holdings revision date, that 
pattern would be a violation against the efficient market hypothesis. 
5.1. Research question 
The purpose of the thesis is to evaluate whether abnormal returns exists around the holdings 
revision date in firms that have a shareholder’s nomination board implemented. To answer that 
the research question is composed in the following way: 
Do there exist abnormal returns around the holdings revision date in companies that have 
adopted a shareholders’ nomination board? 
5.2. Testable hypotheses 
Hypotheses that the research is going to test are based on the intuition that there exist some 
parties that are interested in short-term exploitation of such companies that have shareholder’s 
nomination board in place, through the nomination process as explained above. If such parties 
exist then their pursuit of power might drive the share price up before the holdings revision 
date. That kind of price increase pattern would be totally independent from the company 
fundamentals. According to efficient market hypothesis (EMH), developed by Eugene Fama, 
market prices at any given point in time should “fully reflect” available information (Fama, 
1970). The implication of the EMH is that any chosen trading strategy should not be able to 
produce higher risk-adjusted (abnormal) returns than some other strategy. Therefore, if EMH 
is valid there should not exist abnormal returns around the holdings revision dates. The first 
testable hypothesis is then composed as following: 
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1. Excess positive risk-adjusted returns do not exist before the holdings revision date in 
companies that have adopted a shareholders’ nomination board. 
Testing the market efficiency is always a complicated task due to the joint hypothesis problem. 
Since the researcher needs to make an assumption about the expected returns, the test is always 
conditioned on the underlying model e.g. market model, CAPM, or the three-factor model of 
Fama and French (1993), as well as the test of market efficiency. Thus, if the underlying asset-
pricing model is misspecified one cannot say anything about the market efficiency (Fama, 
1991). On the other hand, the bad-model problem arising from the joint hypothesis testing is 
less serious in event studies that have a shorter return windows because expected daily returns 
are approximately zero and thus have only minor effect on estimates of abnormal returns (Fama, 
1998). While the research approach in hand is an event study the focus on short-term returns 
should mitigate the bad-model problem and so produce uncontaminated results. 
The rejection of the first hypothesis would require that the returns before the holdings revision 
date in companies that have a shareholders’ nomination board would be high enough to exceed 
the returns predicted by the underlying model. If abnormal returns exist before the holdings 
revision date, it may not certainly be due to an activist competing for the nomination right. To 
make any inference about the causation, changes in the share ownerships needs to be evaluated 
too.  
Beforehand it would be very easy to think occasions when abnormal returns before the holdings 
revision date are not related to the nomination rights competition, at all. Let’s say there is a 
company that has a shareholders’ nomination board but the largest five shareholders’ holdings 
in the company have not changed during the past year. Then it would not make sense to claim 
that such a company’s share price is driven up by activist competing for the board nominations. 
Thus, it might be better idea to consider only those holdings revision dates, when there is a 
change in the composition of shareholders’ nomination boards. The second testable hypothesis 
is therefore as following: 
2. Excess positive risk-adjusted returns do not exist before the holdings revision date in years, 
when there is a change in the composition of the shareholders’ nomination board. 
The second hypothesis narrows the sample a lot and in fact might omit some observations when 
there actually existed competition for the nomination board elections. This might happen if the 
competition did not after all yield a change of the shareholders’ nomination board structure. 
However, the competition might still have been severe enough to drive the share price up, which 
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then might have been enough to produce abnormal returns around the holdings revision date. 
Thus, testing both of the hypotheses is justified. 
The ownership structure of a company might have an effect on the behavior of a potential 
activist investor. Especially the government ownership might make activists hesitant for several 
reasons. Firstly, government-ownership in Finland is concentrated on several industries like 
aviation, oil and gas, and mining, where the government has a strategic interest that differs from 
the shareholder value maximization. To ensure that the strategic interest also remains in the 
future the government is reluctant to sell its shares, which complicates the share acquisition for 
an activist in the first place. Even if the activist could buy enough shares to secure a spot in the 
shareholders’ nomination board, getting board member candidates that drive short-term 
shareholder value increasing propositions to the board would be a cumbersome task against the 
majority ownership of the government. What makes the nomination of activist’s board members 
even harder is that most of the times the other largest shareholders are pension funds who are 
more likely to back up the government rather than the activist. Hence, the activists if they exist 
are more likely to target non-government owned companies. Therefore the third testable 
hypothesis is: 
3. Excess positive risk-adjusted returns do not exist before the holdings revision date in those 
firms where the government is not an owner. 
Finally, the fourth testable hypothesis is a combination of the second and third hypotheses. It 
might be a case that the changes in the shareholders’ nomination board are not producing 
positive abnormal returns before the holdings revision date, for instance if there are only some 
companies that are targeted by the activist investors. On the other hand, probably not all non-
government owned companies are attracting the activists’ interest either. Thus, testing the 
combined the effect of changes in the nominator for non-government owned companies should 
be conducted, even though the sample size is going to be quite small. The fourth testable 
hypothesis is formed in a following way: 
4. Excess positive risk-adjusted returns do not exist before the holdings revision date in firms 
that are non-government owned, when there is a change in the composition of the 
shareholders’ nomination board. 
By testing the above-introduced four hypotheses, the thesis evaluates the most critical potential 
sources of positive abnormal returns before holdings revision date, and delivers a 
comprehensive answer to the research question. 
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6. Methodology 
Empirical analyses of the thesis are conducted using event study methodology. The following 
section first compares different event study models and their fit for the research question in 
hand. Then the chosen event study model is introduced and the estimation of the model is 
discussed in more detail. Finally, the chapter concludes how the sample abnormal returns are 
calculated and the test statistics are evaluated. 
6.1. Comparison of different event study models 
The aim of the thesis is to evaluate whether abnormal returns exist around the holdings revision 
dates for companies that have a shareholders’ nomination board in place. To be able to assess 
the abnormal returns around the holdings revision dates I need to estimate the normal returns 
for each company for each year in the time period preceding the holdings revision dates. 
Therefore, I need to divide the data into the estimation windows, where the normal return 
estimates are calculated, and into event windows, in which the abnormal returns are measured. 
As Ball and Brown (1968) notes, the event window and the estimation window should not 
overlap or otherwise the coefficient estimates will be biased since the disturbances are not mean 
zero. Thus, the estimation window precedes the event window that is formed so that the 
holdings revision date that is the event date for each company and each year is in the middle of 
the event window. In addition to the abnormal returns before the event date, the interest is to 
find out whether there are abnormal returns right after the event date. Figure 1 describes the 
timeline of the estimation and event windows. 
The event date is defined as 𝑡 = 0. Hence, the estimation window constitutes from 𝑡 = 𝑇0 + 1 
to 𝑡 = 𝑇1, and similarly the event window is from 𝑡 = 𝑇1 + 1 to 𝑡 = 𝑇2. The length of the 
estimation window is 𝐿1 = 𝑇1 − 𝑇0 and while the length of the event window is 𝐿2 = 𝑇2 − 𝑇1. 
Estimation window (𝐿1) Event window (𝐿2) 
𝑇0 𝑇1 𝑇2 Event 
day 
(𝑡 = 0) 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of the estimation and event window 
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As stated above, the variables of interest in the study are the abnormal returns during the event 
windows. Following the basic methodology of event studies in economics and finance 
described by MacKinlay (1997) the abnormal returns are calculated by subtracting the normal 
return of the stock during the event window from the actual ex post return of the stock in the 
event window. The normal returns are defined as the expected returns without conditioning on 
the event taking place. For company 𝑖 and event date 𝑡 the abnormal return is: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡|𝑋𝑡) 
Where 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the abnormal return, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the actual return, and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡|𝑋𝑡) is the normal return 
for time 𝑡. According to MacKinlay (1997) there are two common statistical ways to model the 
normal returns. The constant mean return model where the conditioning information for the 
normal return model 𝑋𝑡 is a constant, and the market model where 𝑋𝑡 is the market return. 
Alternatively, economic models like the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or Arbitrage 
Pricing Models (APT) could be used in the abnormal returns’ calculations. The CAPM is an 
equilibrium theory shaped by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) where the covariance with the 
market portfolio determines the expected return for a given asset. On the other hand, the APT 
as an asset pricing theory determines the expected return of an asset as a linear combination of 
various risk factors (Ross 1976).  
The paper by Armitage (1995) compares different event study models. Between the two 
statistical models, market model seems to yield more powerful results especially when the event 
dates are same for the different shares. This is due to the fact that the variances of the abnormal 
returns are lower when the portion of the returns that is caused by the variation in the market 
return is removed. Lower variances in the abnormal returns can improve the ability to detect 
the event effects. Additionally, the constant mean return model seems to produce upward biased 
abnormal returns during a bull markets and downward biased abnormal returns during a bear 
market as stated by Klein and Rosenfeld (1987). 
According to MacKinlay (1997), the CAPM model was used widely in event studies during the 
1970s but has since almost ceased due to “deviations implying that the validity of restrictions 
imposed by the CAPM on the market model are questionable”. Therefore, the results may be 
sensitive to specific CAPM restrictions, which is easily avoided by using statistical models that 
do not have similar restrictions. In addition, Dimson and Marsh (1986) as well as Seyhun (1986) 
found out that the CAPM model is much more prone to bias because of the size effect, i.e. a 
share with high returns has also a high regression constant.  
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On the other hand, in the multifactor models like APT the market factor seems to be the most 
important factor and other factors add relatively little explanatory power (MacKinlay (1997)). 
Brown and Weinstein (1985) compare four-factor model to a market model and conclude that 
the use of a more complicated factor model leads to only marginal improvement. MacKinlay 
(1997) concludes that since the main motivation of using APT model is to eliminate biases 
introduced by the CAPM, the simpler statistical models that are also robust to CAPM biases 
are mainly used for event studies.  
In this study, the statistically motivated market model was chosen over the constant mean return 
and economic models. 
6.2. Properties and estimation of the market model 
The market model relates the return of any given asset to the return of the market portfolio. 
Hence, the model has a linear specification that follows from the assumed joint normality of 
asset returns, (see MacKinlay (1997)). The market model for an asset 𝑖 at time 𝑡 is specified as: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + ϵ𝑖𝑡 
𝐸(𝜖𝑖𝑡) = 0           var(𝜖𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝜖𝑖
2  
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return of the asset and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the market portfolio return. 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the zero mean 
noise term while 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖, and 𝜎𝜖𝑖
2  are the parameters of the market model. If the general conditions 
hold, ordinary least squares (OLS) yields consistent estimates for the market model parameters. 
Furthermore, if the assumptions that asset returns are jointly multivariate normal, and 
independently and identically distributed through time the OLS is efficient (MacKinlay (1997)). 
While these assumptions are strong, MacKinlay states that (ibid) they are still empirically 
reasonable and inferences made from the normal return models remain often robust, even 
though the assumptions are not entirely fulfilled. The general evidence suggests that daily 
returns are not normally distributed but rather skewed and fat-tailed, (see e.g. Fama (1965), 
Mandelbrot (1967), and detailed discussion in Officer (1972)). Brown and Warner (1985) show 
that the same applies for the daily abnormal returns too. Although the individual daily returns 
are shown to be non-normally distributed, The Central Limit Theorem results in the sample 
mean abnormal daily returns to converge to normality when the sample size is increased.  
There are reason to believe that the above assumptions are violated since the event windows of 
some of the shares are overlapping in the calendar time. As can be seen from the Figure 2, most 
holdings revision dates are during the autumn. This lead to the cross-sectional dependence of 
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the returns as well as abnormal returns, which is problematic since covariances of the different 
securities’ abnormal returns might not be zero. According to Binder (1998), the cross-sectional 
dependence is just a minor problem if the securities are randomly chosen i.e. from different 
industries, and the market model abnormal returns are used, (detailed evaluation in the Chandra, 
Moriarty and Willinger (1990) paper).  
Further, the time series dependence of average abnormal returns will be unimportant if the event 
period is relatively shorter that the estimation period. Also, Brown and Warner (1985) find that 
the extraction of market factor is a sufficient adjustment for dependence if the stocks are 
selected randomly from various industries. Finally, even if the sample securities are not 
independent and identically distributed drawings from infinite variance distributions there is 
evidence that the distribution of daily mean returns still converges to a normal (see Blattberg 
and Gonedes (1974), Hagerman (1978)). Since the companies that have implemented a 
shareholders’ nomination boards come from different industries and market model is utilized, 
the trouble caused by cross-sectional dependences is mitigated to a great extent and no changes 
to test statistic calculations are required. 
 
Following the notation used in MacKinlay (1997), the OLS estimators of the market model 
parameters for security 𝑖 are calculated from the estimation window’s observations in the 
following way: 
?̂? =
∑ (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖)(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − ?̂?𝑚)
𝑇1
𝑡 = 𝑇0+1
∑ (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − ?̂?𝑚)2
𝑇1
𝑡 = 𝑇0+1
 
0
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Figure 2. Holdings revision dates by month 
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?̂?𝑖 = ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖?̂?𝑚 
?̂?𝜖𝑖
2 =
1
𝐿1 − 2
∑ (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡)
2
𝑇1
𝑡 = 𝑇0+1
 
where  
?̂?𝑖 =
1
𝐿1
∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇1
𝑡 = 𝑇0+1
 
and  
?̂?𝑚 =
1
𝐿1
∑ 𝑅𝑚𝑡
𝑇1
𝑡 = 𝑇0+1
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 are the return in estimation period 𝑡 for security 𝑖 and the market respectively, and 
𝐿1 is the length of the estimation window. 
The abnormal return for the security 𝑖 in the any given day 𝑡 at the event window is: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 
In other words, the abnormal return is the out of sample basis calculated error term of the market 
model. Therefore, the abnormal returns are conditioned on the event window market returns 
and under the null hypothesis, will be jointly normally distributed with a zero conditional mean 
and conditional variance 𝜎2(𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡), where 
𝜎2(𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝜖𝑖
2 +
1
𝐿1
[1 +
(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − ?̂?𝑚)
2
?̂?𝑚2
] 
The conditional variance consists of two parts. The first component is the variance of the error 
term in the estimation process, and the second part is additional variance due to the sampling 
error in ?̂?𝑖 and ?̂?𝑖. As MacKinlay (1997) notes, the sampling error leads to serial correlation of 
the abnormal returns even though the true error terms are independent through time. The simple 
remedy for the serial correlation is to choose long enough estimation window 𝐿1 so that it is 
reasonable to assume that the second part of the variance is zero. Choosing the length of the 
estimation window is balancing between greater precision of estimate parameters and the risk 
of these parameters becoming out of date, as noted by Armitage (1995). For event studies using 
daily data, the length of estimation window usually ranges from 100 to 300 days (Peterson 
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(1989)). Corrado and Zivney (1992) test the effect of different estimation window’s length to 
the test statistics using the market model. They conclude that an estimation window as short as 
89 days produces no difference in the test statistics’ performance, compared to the 239 days 
estimation window. Since the holdings revision dates are annual events the maximum length of 
estimation window is 250 days minus the length of event window, to ensure that the event and 
estimation windows do not overlap. In practice, some companies have decided to change the 
timing of holdings revision date from one year to another, which shortens the maximum length 
of the estimation window even further. For example, Kemira Oyj had the holdings revision date 
in 2008 on December 17 but, for some reason, changed the revision date for the next year to 
the 31st of May. Thus, there was only five and a half months between these two holdings 
revision dates so the length of the estimation would have to be less than 100 days if I would 
like to use the Kemira Oyj 2009 holdings revision date in the study. The study uses 100 trading 
days as the length of the estimation window since it is long enough to reasonably assume that 
the sampling error of the conditional variance becomes zero, and does not lead to many 
exclusions of event dates. What comes to the length of the event window, a window of 11 and 
41 trading days were used in the study. More discussion on the event and estimation window 
length as well as how to deal with special cases like Kemira Oyj in 2009 are included in the 
empirical results chapter. To conclude, the statistical properties of abnormal return for company 
𝑖 at time 𝑡 within the event window are: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2(𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡)) 
To be able to make inferences for the abnormal returns around holdings revision dates the 
abnormal returns needs to be aggregated through time and across the securities. Cumulative 
abnormal return for security 𝑖 between 𝑡1 and 𝑡2, (𝑡1 ≤ 𝑡2, and both 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 are within the 
event window) is defined as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡 = 𝑡1
 
and the asymptotic variance of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 is 
𝜎𝑖
2(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = (𝑡1 − 𝑡2 + 1)𝜎𝜖𝑖
2 . 
According to MacKinlay (1997), the asymptotic variance of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 “can be used for reasonable 
values of 𝐿1” i.e. when the estimation window is long enough. The distribution of the 
cumulative abnormal return under 𝐻0 (the event does not have an effect on the returns) is 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2(𝑡1, 𝑡2)). 
When the null distributions of the abnormal and the cumulative abnormal return are determined 
as above, the statistical tests of the null hypothesis can be done after the aggregation of 
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns across securities. For event period 𝑡 the sample 
aggregated abnormal return for 𝑁 events is  
𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
and the asymptotic variance is 
var(𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡) =
1
𝑁2
∑ 𝜎𝜖𝑖
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
. 
Similarly the aggregated cumulative abnormal return for any interval in the event window is 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 
and its variance is 
var(𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑡1, 𝑡2)) = ∑ var(𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡).
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 
Although, in practice the variance of the residual term 𝜎𝜖𝑖
2  is unknown a sample variance ?̂?𝜖𝑖
2  
can be calculated from the estimation window, and is often used as the estimator to calculate 
the variance of aggregated abnormal returns (see Brown and Warner (1980, p. 253)).  
The test statistic for abnormal return in any given event window day 𝑡 is the ratio of the 
aggregated abnormal at day 𝑡 to its estimated standard deviation. Similarly the test statistic Θ 
for cumulative abnormal returns between any days 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 in the event window is 
Θ =
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑡1, 𝑡2)
√var(𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑡1, 𝑡2))
 . 
The distribution of both test statistics follow Student-t with (𝑁 − 2) degrees of freedom. When 
the sample size is large, the test statistic is assumed to be unit normal. 
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7. Empirical results 
There are four hypotheses about the existence of abnormal returns around holdings revision 
date, which this thesis is going to test. First hypothesis evaluates whether there exist abnormal 
returns around holdings revision date in general. Second hypothesis narrows the test to only 
those company-years when there is a change in the nominator. In third hypothesis, the scope of 
the test is on firms that are non-government owned. Finally, the fourth hypothesis is a 
combination of the second and third hypotheses, and evaluates non-government owned 
companies when there is a change in the nominator. 
As briefly discussed in the methodology section, the length of the estimation window was set 
to 100 trading days and 11-days as well as 41-days event windows were used. The use of two 
different event window lengths was chosen so that I can account for the shorter and longer 
period cumulative abnormal returns around the event date. The results were exactly the same 
when 150 trading days estimation window were used, and hence these are not reported. An even 
longer 200 trading days estimation window would have required exclusion of 22 event dates 
(20% of the whole sample), which would have had a significant effect on the results, and 
therefore was not used in the study. 
Testing each hypotheses required some adjustments to the data, which are discussed in detail 
under each section. For example, some companies did not have enough share price data before 
the event date, so the same estimation window could not have been used, and thus these 
company-years were excluded from the study. Additionally, if a company had some major event 
that had an effect on the share price during the event window in any year, then these years were 
not considered in the study.  
Another aspect that needs to be considered is how to deal with companies that have dual share 
classes. Firms with dual share class and shareholders’ nomination board are Aktia Oyj, Kesla 
Oyj, Stockmann Oyj, Stora Enso Oyj and Ålandsbanken Oyj. Since the main difference between 
the share classes is that the other class has more voting rights (voting share) compared to the 
other class (non-voting share), a shareholder who competes for the shareholders’ nomination 
board places would be better off buying the voting shares than the non-voting shares. That is 
not possible in the case of Kesla Oyj since the voting shares are not publicly listed. Another 
thing is that there are often notably less voting shares and the illiquidity can make buying those 
shares a difficult task. Therefore, the largest shareholders could also buy the non-voting shares 
to increase their position before the holdings revision date.  
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Because the inclusion of just voting shares might not capture the whole effect, an alternative 
solution might be to consider both share classes in the study. This approach has a severe 
drawback since then firms that have dual share class would have double weight in the 
evaluation, assuming that the correlation between the share classes is strong and positive. 
Additionally, the strong positive correlation between the share classes would cause the returns 
and abnormal returns to have high cross-sectional dependence. As discussed in the 
methodology section the cross-sectional dependence of the abnormal returns results in distorted 
test-statistics and the traditional tests cannot be carried out. Therefore, using both share classes 
is problematic and will not be considered in the study. Since there seem not to be a single best 
solution for handling the dual share classes, I am going to test all the hypotheses using samples 
including only voting shares and only non-voting shares, where applicable, and report all the 
results. A further discussion is provided when the results deviate from each other. 
7.1. Abnormal returns around all holdings revision date 
Testing the first hypothesis, whether abnormal returns exist around holdings revision date in 
general, includes all the company-years that have enough preceding share price data so that the 
estimation and event window can be formed. Thus, the holdings revision dates of Asiakastieto 
Oyj 2015 and Kemira Oyj 2009 are excluded from the analysis. In addition, Componenta Oyj 
announced that it had filed for restructuring on the day after its holdings revision date in 20164, 
which had a significant negative reaction to the company share and therefore is removed from 
the consideration. After the removal of dual share classes the size of the samples including 
voting and non-voting shares are 191 company holdings revision dates. 
The mean abnormal returns for 41-days event window, presented in the Table 9, are similar to 
both samples and there seem to be no positive abnormal returns before the holdings revision 
date. The event date mean abnormal returns are almost the same for both samples -0.0018 and 
-0.0021, which are not statistically significant from zero with a standard error of 0.0015. The 
only statistically significant mean abnormal returns at 5-% level are negative, and are probably 
generated by noise in the data. There are no sign of positive average abnormal returns before 
the event date that would be a sign of competition for the shareholders’ nomination board 
places, and in fact, the negative event date average abnormal return would suggest merely 
excessively selling the shares rather than buying them.   
                                                 
4 Componenta Corporation Stock Exchange Release on 1.9.2016: 
https://newsclient.omxgroup.com/cdsPublic/viewDisclosure.action?disclosureId=725737&lang=en 
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Table 9. Sample abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for all holdings revision dates 
(event window = 41 trading days) 
 
Abnormal Returns - t-stat table (n = 191)  
Critical values: 10-% level (1.653) *,  
5-% level (1.972) **, and 1-% level (2.602) *** 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns - t-stat table (n = 191)  
Critical values: 10-% level (1.653) *,  
5-% level (1.972) **, and 1-% level (2.602) ***     
 Voting shares  Non-voting shares   Voting shares  Non-voting shares  
Day AR t-value  AR t-value   CAR t-value  CAR t-value  
-20 0.0001 0.067   -0.0001 -0.071    0.0001 0.067   -0.0001 -0.071   
-19 -0.0005 -0.337   -0.0002 -0.142    -0.0004 -0.191   -0.0003 -0.150   
-18 0.0000 0.000   0.0001 0.071    -0.0004 -0.156   -0.0003 -0.123   
-17 0.0002 0.135   0.0007 0.497    -0.0002 -0.067   0.0005 0.177   
-16 -0.0004 -0.270   -0.0002 -0.142    -0.0006 -0.181   0.0002 0.063   
-15 -0.0013 -0.877   -0.0021 -1.490    -0.0019 -0.524   -0.0019 -0.550   
-14 0.0020 1.350   0.0026 1.845 *  0.0001 0.026   0.0007 0.188   
-13 0.0005 0.337   -0.0002 -0.142    0.0005 0.119   0.0005 0.125   
-12 -0.0002 -0.135   0.0002 0.142    0.0003 0.067   0.0007 0.166   
-11 -0.0035 -2.362 ** -0.0039 -2.767 ***  -0.0031 -0.662   -0.0032 -0.718   
-10 0.0009 0.607   0.0007 0.497    -0.0023 -0.468   -0.0025 -0.535   
-9 0.0001 0.067   -0.0004 -0.284    -0.0022 -0.429   -0.0029 -0.594   
-8 -0.0009 -0.607   -0.0006 -0.426    -0.0031 -0.580   -0.0035 -0.689   
-7 -0.0054 -3.645 *** -0.0061 -4.328 ***  -0.0085 -1.533   -0.0096 -1.820 * 
-6 -0.0016 -1.080   -0.0009 -0.639    -0.0101 -1.760 * -0.0106 -1.942 * 
-5 0.0000 0.000   -0.0009 -0.639    -0.0101 -1.704 * -0.0115 -2.040 ** 
-4 0.0001 0.067   0.0006 0.426    -0.0100 -1.637   -0.0109 -1.876 * 
-3 -0.0021 -1.417   -0.0021 -1.490    -0.0121 -1.925 * -0.0130 -2.174 ** 
-2 0.0017 1.147   0.0018 1.277    -0.0103 -1.595   -0.0112 -1.823 * 
-1 -0.0014 -0.945   -0.0014 -0.993    -0.0118 -1.781 * -0.0125 -1.983 ** 
0 -0.0018 -1.215   -0.0021 -1.490    -0.0135 -1.988 ** -0.0146 -2.260 ** 
1 0.0003 0.202   -0.0003 -0.213    -0.0132 -1.899 * -0.0149 -2.254 ** 
2 -0.0008 -0.540   -0.0008 -0.568    -0.0140 -1.970 * -0.0157 -2.323 ** 
3 0.0011 0.742   0.0014 0.993    -0.0129 -1.777 * -0.0142 -2.056 ** 
4 -0.0001 -0.067   -0.0002 -0.142    -0.0131 -1.768 * -0.0145 -2.057 ** 
5 0.0006 0.405   0.0007 0.497    -0.0125 -1.655 * -0.0138 -1.920 * 
6 0.0001 0.067   0.0008 0.568    -0.0124 -1.611   -0.0130 -1.775 * 
7 -0.0010 -0.675   -0.0017 -1.206    -0.0134 -1.709 * -0.0148 -1.984 ** 
8 -0.0028 -1.890 * -0.0019 -1.348    -0.0162 -2.030 ** -0.0167 -2.200 ** 
9 0.0019 1.282   0.0005 0.355    -0.0142 -1.750 * -0.0161 -2.085 ** 
10 -0.0020 -1.350   -0.0015 -1.064    -0.0162 -1.964 * -0.0176 -2.243 ** 
11 -0.0028 -1.890 * -0.0038 -2.696 ***  -0.0190 -2.267 ** -0.0214 -2.684 *** 
12 -0.0029 -1.957 * -0.0035 -2.483 **  -0.0219 -2.573 ** -0.0250 -3.088 *** 
13 0.0020 1.350   0.0017 1.206    -0.0199 -2.303 ** -0.0232 -2.823 *** 
14 -0.0008 -0.540   0.0000 0.000    -0.0206 -2.350 ** -0.0232 -2.782 *** 
15 -0.0011 -0.742   -0.0019 -1.348    -0.0218 -2.452 ** -0.0251 -2.968 *** 
16 0.0001 0.067   0.0003 0.213    -0.0217 -2.408 ** -0.0248 -2.893 *** 
17 -0.0003 -0.202   0.0001 0.071    -0.0220 -2.409 ** -0.0248 -2.854 *** 
18 -0.0010 -0.675   -0.0009 -0.639    -0.0229 -2.475 ** -0.0257 -2.920 *** 
19 -0.0007 -0.472   -0.0011 -0.780    -0.0236 -2.519 ** -0.0268 -3.006 *** 
20 -0.0016 -1.080   -0.0019 -1.348     -0.0252 -2.656 *** -0.0286 -3.169 *** 
  
39 
 
 
Figure 3. Voting share sample CARs around all revision dates 
 
Figure 4. Non-voting share sample CARs around all revision dates 
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Neither the average cumulative abnormal returns for 41-days event window (see Table 9), 
provide any proof of positive cumulative abnormal returns, due to competition of nomination 
rights, before holdings revision date. On the contrary, both samples have a statistically 
significant negative event date average CAR on the 5-% level, -0.0135 for voting and -0.0146 
for non-voting sample, and the average CAR plots in Figures 3 and 4 are downward sloping. 
For the non-voting shares sample the mean CARs are more negative across the whole event 
window, and remain statistically significant from 7 days before the event until the end of the 
event window on the 10-% level. 
In the shorter 11-days event window, all the mean abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns 
in both samples are statistically insignificant at the 10-% level (see Table 10). Hence, the 
average abnormal returns seem to be flat in the short period around the holdings revision date 
and the event day CARs remain negative. 
There are no evidence for positive abnormal returns around holdings revision date in general 
and the first null hypotheses is not rejected. Vice versa, there seems to be a pattern that 
companies with shareholders’ nomination boards produce negative abnormal returns around 
the holdings revision date in general. A clear downward drift can be seen in the cumulative 
abnormal returns even before the holdings revision date, and that drift becomes statistically 
more and more significant after the event date. 
Table 10. Sample abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for all holdings revision dates 
(event window = 11 trading days) 
 
Abnormal Returns - t-stat table (n = 191)  
Critical values: 10-% level (1.653) *, 5-% level (1.972) 
**, and 1-% level (2.602) *** 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns - t-stat table (n = 191)  
Critical values: 10-% level (1.653) *, 5-% level (1.972) 
**, and 1-% level (2.602) ***     
 Voting shares  Non-voting shares   Voting shares  Non-voting shares  
Day AR t-value  AR t-value   CAR t-value  CAR t-value  
-5 0.0002 0.135   -0.0007 -0.498    0.0002 0.135   -0.0007 -0.498   
-4 0.0001 0.067   0.0006 0.427    0.0002 0.095   -0.0001 -0.050   
-3 -0.0019 -1.282   -0.0020 -1.424    -0.0017 -0.662   -0.0021 -0.863   
-2 0.0017 1.147   0.0018 1.281    0.0000 0.000   -0.0003 -0.107   
-1 -0.0016 -1.080   -0.0015 -1.068    -0.0015 -0.453   -0.0017 -0.541   
0 -0.0017 -1.147   -0.0019 -1.353    -0.0032 -0.882   -0.0037 -1.075   
1 0.0004 0.270   -0.0001 -0.071    -0.0028 -0.714   -0.0038 -1.022   
2 -0.0009 -0.607   -0.0009 -0.641    -0.0037 -0.883   -0.0047 -1.183   
3 0.0013 0.877   0.0016 1.139    -0.0024 -0.540   -0.0031 -0.736   
4 0.0002 0.135   0.0001 0.071    -0.0022 -0.470   -0.0030 -0.675   
5 0.0006 0.405   0.0007 0.498     -0.0016 -0.326   -0.0023 -0.494   
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7.2. Abnormal returns around holdings revision date when the nominator changes 
In general, there seem not to be positive abnormal returns before holdings revision date. 
Because the lack of positive abnormal returns before holdings revision date, there does not seem 
to be competition for the shareholders’ nomination board places on average, at least such that 
would affect share prices. On the other hand, the competition might exist for some firms in 
some years but is not visible in the whole sample. When there is a change in the nominator, it 
might be a sign of that competition. Therefore, testing the second hypothesis, the existence of 
abnormal returns around holdings revision date when there is a change in the nominator might 
yield different results. 
There are 64 holdings revision dates when at least one of the nominators of the shareholders’ 
nomination board changed. Nominator changes occurred in 23 companies out of the 34. For 
some firms the data was available only for one year, which makes the occurrence of changes 
obviously impossible but there was some companies like Ålandsbanken Oyj and Stora Enso 
Oyj where no changes in the shareholders’ nomination board happened even 4 and 12 years 
after the founding of the board. Since Componenta announced its filing for the restructuring 
during the event window of 2016 that company-year is excluded, and the final sample consist 
of 63 holdings revision dates. Finally, there are no companies having dual share classes in the 
sample so no adjustments for that are required. 
Even though only years when there is a change in the nominator are evaluated, the mean 
abnormal returns for the 41-days event window, presented in Table 11, provide no evidence 
against the second null hypothesis. The event day sample abnormal return is again negative        
-0.0009 and statistically insignificant, with a standard error of 0.0027. There is only one 
statistically significant positive average abnormal return, at 5-% level, before the event day. On 
the other hand, there are two significant negative sample abnormal returns before the event day 
and no conclusions can be made against the null hypothesis.  
The sample cumulative abnormal return is again downward drifting (see Figure 5), similar to 
the first hypothesis and becomes statistically significant negative first time 7 days before the 
holdings revision date and again three as well as one day before the event day, at the 10-% 
level. There is no sign of positive mean CAR that would result from the competition for the 
shareholders’ nomination board rights.  
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Table 11. Sample abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns when there is a change in 
nominator (event window = 41 trading days) 
 Abnormal Returns & CARs - t-stat table (n = 63)  
 
Critical values: 10-% level (1.670) *, 5-% level 
(1.999) **, and 1-% level (2.657) ***    
 Abnormal returns  CARs  
Day AR t-value  CAR t-value  
-20 0.0007 0.264   0.0007 0.264   
-19 0.0009 0.340   0.0016 0.427   
-18 -0.0032 -1.208   -0.0016 -0.349   
-17 -0.0024 -0.906   -0.0041 -0.774   
-16 0.0053 2.000 ** 0.0012 0.203   
-15 -0.0004 -0.151   0.0008 0.123   
-14 0.0019 0.717   0.0027 0.385   
-13 -0.0026 -0.981   0.0001 0.013   
-12 -0.0018 -0.679   -0.0017 -0.214   
-11 -0.0064 -2.415 ** -0.0081 -0.967   
-10 0.0021 0.792   -0.0060 -0.683   
-9 -0.0007 -0.264   -0.0067 -0.730   
-8 -0.0013 -0.491   -0.0080 -0.837   
-7 -0.0091 -3.434 *** -0.0171 -1.725 * 
-6 -0.0009 -0.340   -0.0180 -1.754 * 
-5 0.0017 0.641   -0.0163 -1.538   
-4 -0.0011 -0.415   -0.0174 -1.592   
-3 -0.0052 -1.962 * -0.0226 -2.010 ** 
-2 0.0034 1.283   -0.0192 -1.662   
-1 -0.0008 -0.302   -0.0200 -1.688 * 
0 -0.0009 -0.340   -0.0209 -1.721 * 
1 -0.0039 -1.472   -0.0248 -1.995 * 
2 0.0001 0.038   -0.0247 -1.943 * 
3 0.0006 0.226   -0.0242 -1.864 * 
4 0.0009 0.340   -0.0232 -1.751 * 
5 0.0026 0.981   -0.0206 -1.524   
6 0.0026 0.981   -0.0181 -1.314   
7 -0.0043 -1.623   -0.0224 -1.597   
8 -0.0009 -0.340   -0.0233 -1.633   
9 0.0007 0.264   -0.0225 -1.550   
10 -0.0055 -2.075 ** -0.0281 -1.904 * 
11 -0.0009 -0.340   -0.0290 -1.934 * 
12 -0.0029 -1.094   -0.0319 -2.095 ** 
13 0.0007 0.264   -0.0312 -2.019 ** 
14 -0.0012 -0.453   -0.0324 -2.067 ** 
15 -0.0022 -0.830   -0.0345 -2.170 ** 
16 0.0011 0.415   -0.0334 -2.072 ** 
17 -0.0033 -1.245   -0.0367 -2.247 ** 
18 -0.0029 -1.094   -0.0396 -2.393 ** 
19 0.0000 0.000   -0.0397 -2.369 ** 
20 -0.0090 -3.396 *** -0.0486 -2.864 *** 
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Figure 5. Sample CARs around holdings revision change when there is a change in nominator 
Neither, is there any sign of positive mean abnormal or cumulative abnormal returns in the 
shorter 11-days event window before the event day, reported in Table 12. None of the sample 
abnormal or cumulative abnormal returns are significant from zero at the 5-% level. The mean 
CAR seems to be flat in the short-term around the event day, with negative statistically 
insignificant -0.0022 value on the event day, similar as when all the company-years were 
included in the first hypothesis. 
No evidence can be found against the second the null hypothesis, and it stays valid. Seems like 
the change in the nominator of shareholders’ nomination board is no sign of a competition for 
the nomination rights, at least in such a magnitude that would raise the share price to yield 
abnormal positive returns. The second null hypothesis is not rejected and stays valid. 
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Table 12. Sample abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns when there is a change in 
nominator (event window = 11 trading days) 
 
Abnormal Returns & CARs - t-stat table (n = 63)  
Critical values: 10-% level (1.670) *, 5-% level (1.999) **, 
and 1-% level (2.657) ***   
 Abnormal returns  CARs  
Day AR t-value  CAR t-value  
-5 0.0020 0.768   0.0020 0.768   
-4 -0.0012 -0.461   0.0008 0.217   
-3 -0.0048 -1.843 * -0.0040 -0.886   
-2 0.0034 1.305   -0.0006 -0.115   
-1 -0.0009 -0.345   -0.0015 -0.258   
0 -0.0007 -0.269   -0.0022 -0.345   
1 -0.0041 -1.574   -0.0063 -0.914   
2 -0.0002 -0.077   -0.0065 -0.882   
3 0.0010 0.384   -0.0055 -0.704   
4 0.0013 0.499   -0.0042 -0.510   
5 0.0023 0.883   -0.0019 -0.220   
 
7.3. Abnormal returns around holdings revision date for non-government owned firms 
The idea behind the third hypothesis is to test whether the ownership and particularly the 
government having a major stake in the company might have an effect on the abnormal returns 
around holdings revision date. For an activist investor or group who wants to influence the 
company decision-making through nominating their representative to the board, companies that 
are governmentally owned are not the most attractive targets. The government ownership is 
often focused on specific industries, where the government has some special interest that most 
of the time differs from maximal value creation to shareholders. To ensure that the special 
interest is secured in the future as well, the government does not want to give up its ownership, 
which makes the activist’s attempt to acquire the shares needed to influence the decision-
making much harder. Therefore, the activist investors or other parties who want to affect the 
company decision-making through board nominations would more likely choose non-
government owned companies for their targets, and thus the competition for the shareholders’ 
nomination board places would more likely exist among these firms. 
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Table 13. Sample abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for non-government owned firms 
(event window = 41 trading days) 
 
Abnormal Returns - t-stat table (n = 78)  
Critical values: 10-% level (1.665) *, 5-% level 
(1.991) **, and 1-% level (2.641) *** 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns - t-stat table (n = 78)  
Critical values: 10-% level (1.665) *, 5-% level 
(1.991) **, and 1-% level (2.641) ***     
 Voting shares  Non-voting shares   Voting shares  Non-voting shares  
Day AR t-value  AR t-value   CAR t-value  CAR t-value  
-20 -0.0004 -0.173   0.0010 0.476    -0.0004 -0.173   0.0010 0.476   
-19 -0.0014 -0.607   -0.0002 -0.095    -0.0018 -0.552   0.0008 0.269   
-18 0.0026 1.127   0.0022 1.046    0.0008 0.200   0.0030 0.824   
-17 -0.0019 -0.824   -0.0010 -0.476    -0.0011 -0.238   0.0020 0.476   
-16 -0.0005 -0.217   0.0000 0.000    -0.0016 -0.310   0.0020 0.425   
-15 -0.0031 -1.344   -0.0040 -1.903 *  -0.0047 -0.832   -0.0021 -0.408   
-14 0.0008 0.347   0.0016 0.761    -0.0039 -0.639   -0.0004 -0.072   
-13 0.0004 0.173   -0.0005 -0.238    -0.0035 -0.536   -0.0010 -0.168   
-12 -0.0008 -0.347   0.0009 0.428    -0.0042 -0.607   -0.0001 -0.016   
-11 -0.0010 -0.433   -0.0019 -0.904    -0.0053 -0.727   -0.0020 -0.301   
-10 0.0033 1.431   0.0037 1.760 *  -0.0020 -0.261   0.0017 0.244   
-9 -0.0016 -0.694   -0.0025 -1.189    -0.0036 -0.451   -0.0008 -0.110   
-8 -0.0008 -0.347   -0.0006 -0.285    -0.0044 -0.529   -0.0013 -0.171   
-7 -0.0024 -1.040   -0.0031 -1.474    -0.0068 -0.788   -0.0044 -0.559   
-6 -0.0016 -0.694   -0.0016 -0.761    -0.0084 -0.940   -0.0061 -0.749   
-5 0.0017 0.737   0.0012 0.571    -0.0067 -0.726   -0.0048 -0.571   
-4 -0.0009 -0.390   0.0006 0.285    -0.0076 -0.799   -0.0042 -0.484   
-3 0.0010 0.433   -0.0008 -0.381    -0.0066 -0.674   -0.0050 -0.561   
-2 -0.0009 -0.390   -0.0002 -0.095    -0.0075 -0.746   -0.0053 -0.578   
-1 -0.0016 -0.694   -0.0015 -0.713    -0.0090 -0.872   -0.0068 -0.723   
0 0.0015 0.650   0.0011 0.523    -0.0076 -0.719   -0.0057 -0.592   
1 0.0016 0.694   0.0006 0.285    -0.0059 -0.545   -0.0052 -0.527   
2 -0.0053 -2.298 ** -0.0050 -2.378 **  -0.0113 -1.021   -0.0102 -1.012   
3 -0.0004 -0.173   0.0001 0.048    -0.0117 -1.035   -0.0101 -0.981   
4 -0.0003 -0.130   -0.0014 -0.666    -0.0120 -1.040   -0.0115 -1.094   
5 -0.0002 -0.087   -0.0003 -0.143    -0.0122 -1.037   -0.0118 -1.101   
6 -0.0008 -0.347   0.0002 0.095    -0.0130 -1.085   -0.0116 -1.062   
7 -0.0017 -0.737   -0.0019 -0.904    -0.0147 -1.204   -0.0135 -1.213   
8 -0.0048 -2.081 ** -0.0026 -1.237    -0.0195 -1.570   -0.0161 -1.422   
9 0.0024 1.040   -0.0013 -0.618    -0.0171 -1.353   -0.0174 -1.511   
10 -0.0039 -1.691 * -0.0028 -1.332    -0.0209 -1.627   -0.0203 -1.734 * 
11 -0.0030 -1.300   -0.0038 -1.807 *  -0.0240 -1.839 * -0.0241 -2.026 ** 
12 0.0050 2.167 ** 0.0021 0.999    -0.0190 -1.434   -0.0220 -1.822 * 
13 -0.0009 -0.390   -0.0009 -0.428    -0.0199 -1.479   -0.0229 -1.868 * 
14 -0.0005 -0.217   0.0003 0.143    -0.0204 -1.495   -0.0226 -1.817 * 
15 -0.0024 -1.040   -0.0027 -1.284    -0.0228 -1.647   -0.0253 -2.006 ** 
16 -0.0006 -0.260   -0.0010 -0.476    -0.0235 -1.675 * -0.0263 -2.056 ** 
17 -0.0003 -0.130   -0.0006 -0.285    -0.0238 -1.674 * -0.0269 -2.076 ** 
18 0.0000 0.000   -0.0002 -0.095    -0.0238 -1.652   -0.0271 -2.064 ** 
19 -0.0042 -1.821 * -0.0036 -1.712 *  -0.0280 -1.919 * -0.0307 -2.309 ** 
20 -0.0011 -0.477   -0.0022 -1.046     -0.0291 -1.970 * -0.0329 -2.444 ** 
  
46 
 
The sample of non-government owned companies event days consist of 80 holdings revision 
dates, of which Componenta 2016 and Asiakastieto 2015 as in other parts. Overall, there are 
holdings revision dates from 23 companies, including Aktia Oyj, Stockmann Oyj, and 
Ålandsbanken Oyj that have dual share classes. To account for the dual share classes the sample 
is divided into voting and non-voting share test samples, both of them including 78 events.  
The mean abnormal returns for both test samples for the 41-days event window are reported in 
Table 13. There are only minor differences between the sample abnormal returns, and neither 
sample has any abnormal returns that would be significantly different from zero at 5-% level, 
before the event day. The event day sample abnormal returns are both positive, 0.0015 and
 
Figure 6. Voting share sample CARs for non-government owned firms 
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Figure 7. Non-voting share sample CARs for non-government owned firms 
 0.0011, but with standard errors of 0.0023 and 0.0021, respectively, remain statistically 
insignificant from zero. The only average abnormal return for both voting and non-voting 
samples that is significant at 5-% level is negative and happens two days after the event day. 
Again, there are no indications that would back the rejection of the null. 
Plotting the mean CARs reveal almost identical graphs for both samples (Figures 6 and 7) 
before and shortly after the event day. In both samples the average CAR is close to flat before 
the event day, slightly negative at event day -0.0076 for voting and -0.0057 for non-voting 
sample, and then drifts to statistically significant negative before the end of the event window. 
In the shorter 11-days event window, there are no signs of positive mean abnormal or 
cumulative abnormal returns before the holdings revision date (see Table 14). Although, the 
sign of both samples’ mean CARs changes to positive the values remain so close to zero that 
they are both statistically insignificant. 
The non-government ownership does not lead to positive abnormal returns before the holdings 
revision date either. Hence, there is no evidence against the third null hypothesis and it is not 
rejected.  
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Table 14. Sample abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for non-government owned firms 
(event window = 11 trading days) 
 
Abnormal Returns - t-stat table (n = 78)  
Critical values: 10-% level (1.665) *, 5-% level 
(1.991) **, and 1-% level (2.641) *** 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns - t-stat table (n = 78)  
Critical values: 10-% level (1.665) *, 5-% level (1.991) 
**, and 1-% level (2.641) ***     
 Voting shares  Non-voting shares   Voting shares  Non-voting shares  
Day AR t-value  AR t-value   CAR t-value  CAR t-value  
-5 0.0018 0.756   0.0013 0.599    0.0018 0.756   0.0013 0.599   
-4 -0.0010 -0.420   0.0004 0.184    0.0007 0.208   0.0017 0.554   
-3 0.0009 0.378   -0.0008 -0.368    0.0016 0.388   0.0009 0.239   
-2 -0.0009 -0.378   -0.0002 -0.092    0.0007 0.147   0.0007 0.161   
-1 -0.0016 -0.672   -0.0016 -0.737    -0.0009 -0.169   -0.0009 -0.185   
0 0.0013 0.546   0.0010 0.461    0.0004 0.069   0.0001 0.019   
1 0.0018 0.756   0.0008 0.368    0.0022 0.349   0.0009 0.157   
2 -0.0053 -2.226 ** -0.0050 -2.303 **  -0.0031 -0.460   -0.0041 -0.668   
3 -0.0006 -0.252   -0.0001 -0.046    -0.0036 -0.504   -0.0042 -0.645   
4 -0.0002 -0.084   -0.0014 -0.645    -0.0038 -0.505   -0.0056 -0.816   
5 -0.0002 -0.084   -0.0004 -0.184     -0.0041 -0.519   -0.0059 -0.819   
 
A noticeable fact is that governmental ownership seem to have a slight effect on the share 
performance before the holdings revision date, and non-government owned firms seem to 
perform better than their government owned peers by having less negative pre-event abnormal 
returns.  
7.4. Abnormal returns around holdings revision date for non-government owned firms 
when the nominator changes 
The fourth and final hypothesis tests whether a change in the nominators of non-government 
owned firms, would lead to positive abnormal returns before holdings revision date that could 
be due to the competition for the shareholders’ nomination board places. As the second and the 
third hypothesis were not rejected, neither the change in the nominators nor being a non-
government owned company did lead to positive abnormal returns before holdings revision 
dates, alone. That does not entail that these two features together might not lead to positive 
abnormal returns before holdings revision date, and hence should be tested.  
Because of the two restrictions on company-year features, the sample size is significantly 
smaller than in the other tests. There are only 24 holdings revision dates, when the nominators 
have changed for non-government owned firms. Additionally, one of these occasions is 
Componenta 2016 that needs to be excluded from the test as in previous sections. Thus, the test  
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Table 15. Sample abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for non-government owned firms 
when nominator changes (event window = 41 trading days) 
 
Abnormal Returns & CARs - t-stat table (n = 23)  
Critical values: 10-% level (1.717) *, 5-% level 
(2.074) **, and 1-% level (2.819) *** 
 
    
 Abnormal returns  CARs  
Day AR t-value  CAR t-value  
-20 0.0044 1.131   0.0044 1.131   
-19 -0.0025 -0.642   0.0019 0.345   
-18 -0.0066 -1.696   -0.0047 -0.697   
-17 -0.0038 -0.976   -0.0085 -1.092   
-16 0.0039 1.002   -0.0046 -0.529   
-15 -0.0032 -0.822   -0.0078 -0.818   
-14 -0.0021 -0.540   -0.0098 -0.952   
-13 -0.0059 -1.516   -0.0157 -1.426   
-12 -0.0015 -0.385   -0.0172 -1.473   
-11 -0.0044 -1.131   -0.0217 -1.763 * 
-10 0.0051 1.310   -0.0166 -1.286   
-9 -0.0034 -0.874   -0.0199 -1.476   
-8 -0.0009 -0.231   -0.0208 -1.482   
-7 -0.0027 -0.694   -0.0235 -1.614   
-6 -0.0045 -1.156   -0.0281 -1.864 * 
-5 -0.0031 -0.797   -0.0312 -2.004 * 
-4 0.0009 0.231   -0.0303 -1.888 * 
-3 -0.0015 -0.385   -0.0318 -1.926 * 
-2 -0.0015 -0.385   -0.0333 -1.963 * 
-1 -0.0008 -0.206   -0.0341 -1.959 * 
0 0.0095 2.441 ** -0.0246 -1.379   
1 -0.0016 -0.411   -0.0262 -1.435   
2 -0.0085 -2.184 ** -0.0347 -1.859 * 
3 -0.0024 -0.617   -0.0370 -1.941 * 
4 -0.0004 -0.103   -0.0374 -1.922 * 
5 -0.0019 -0.488   -0.0393 -1.980 * 
6 0.0016 0.411   -0.0377 -1.864 * 
7 -0.0004 -0.103   -0.0381 -1.850 * 
8 -0.0012 -0.308   -0.0393 -1.875 * 
9 -0.0018 -0.463   -0.0411 -1.928 * 
10 -0.0082 -2.107 ** -0.0493 -2.275 ** 
11 -0.0042 -1.079   -0.0535 -2.430 ** 
12 0.0052 1.336   -0.0483 -2.160 ** 
13 -0.0076 -1.953 * -0.0559 -2.463 ** 
14 0.0019 0.488   -0.0540 -2.345 ** 
15 -0.0001 -0.026   -0.0541 -2.317 ** 
16 0.0009 0.231   -0.0532 -2.247 ** 
17 -0.0009 -0.231   -0.0541 -2.255 ** 
18 -0.0003 -0.077   -0.0544 -2.238 ** 
19 -0.0062 -1.593   -0.0606 -2.462 ** 
20 -0.0136 -3.495 *** -0.0742 -2.978 *** 
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sample consist of 23 events from 12 different companies. None of the companies has dual shares 
so no further division of the sample is needed. 
Table 15 presents the average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for the non-
government owned firms when there is a change in the nominators in the 41-days event window. 
There are no statistically significant positive sample abnormal returns before the event day like 
there has not been in any of the previous tests either. Unlike in the other tests, the sample 
abnormal return on the event day 0.0095, with 0.0039 standard error, is statistically significant 
and positive on the 5-% level. This might be an indication of the last moment excessive buying 
before the holdings are revised and shareholders’ nomination board places determined. 
Furthermore, the sample abnormal return two days after the event day is statistically significant 
and negative -0.0085, with almost the same magnitude as the event day mean abnormal return. 
This might also be a sign of an attempt to benefit short-term by achieving the place in the 
shareholders’ nomination board and then selling the some of the shares after the nomination 
right is granted.   
 
Figure 8. Sample CARs for non-government owned firms when there is a change in nominator 
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Even though the event day average abnormal return is significant and positive, the average CAR 
is significant and negative, though not at 5-% rather at the 10-% level, from 6 days before the 
event day until the day before the event. Hence, the positive average abnormal return at the 
holdings revision date is not as compelling evidence against the null hypothesis since the 
average cumulative abnormal return before the event is significant and negative, and the event 
day sample CAR remains negative -0.0246.  The pattern of cumulative abnormal returns can 
be seen from the graph of CARs in Figure 8. 
Table 16. Sample abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for non-government owned firms 
when nominator changes (event window = 11 trading days) 
 
Abnormal Returns & CARs - t-stat table (n = 23)  
Critical values: 10-% level (1.717) *, 5-% level 
(2.074) **, and 1-% level (2.819) *** 
 
    
 Abnormal returns  CARs  
Day AR t-value  CAR t-value  
-5 -0.0030 -0.752   -0.0030 -0.752   
-4 0.0010 0.251   -0.0020 -0.354   
-3 -0.0011 -0.276   -0.0031 -0.448   
-2 -0.0016 -0.401   -0.0048 -0.601   
-1 -0.0008 -0.200   -0.0056 -0.627   
0 0.0096 2.405 ** 0.0040 0.409   
1 -0.0013 -0.326   0.0027 0.256   
2 -0.0083 -2.079 ** -0.0056 -0.496   
3 -0.0024 -0.601   -0.0080 -0.668   
4 0.0001 0.025   -0.0079 -0.626   
5 -0.0017 -0.426   -0.0096 -0.725   
 
As opposed to the longer 41-days event window, the sample CAR remains positive 0.0040 in 
the shorter 11-days event window, reported in Table 16. Still, the event day sample CAR does 
not differ statistically from zero. Other than the event day positive return of 0.0096 and two 
days after the event negative -0.0083 returns, the sample abnormal returns are close to zero near 
the event day, see Figure 9. 
The test statistics indicate that there are some evidence against the fourth null hypothesis. The 
event day significant and positive return is a sign of positive abnormal returns before the 
holdings revision. Additionally, the significant negative return of same magnitude two days 
after the event might be a sign that some party bought the shares just for ensuring their place in 
the shareholders’ nomination board and then dumped the shares right after the holdings revision 
was conducted. On the other hand, the significant and negative sample CARs before the event 
day are more likely signs of excessive selling rather than buying the shares, which  
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Figure 9. Sample abnormal returns for non-government owned companies when there is a 
change in nominator (event window = 11 trading days) 
might indicate that no competition that drives the share price up exists. Out of the two 
contradictory results, the latter, the negative sample CARs before the holdings revision date is 
an evidence against positive abnormal returns in a longer horizon before the event. Then again, 
the positive event day sample abnormal return is an evidence for short-term positive abnormal 
returns that might be due to last chance buying attempt to secure the nomination right.  
A further analysis of ownership changes around the holdings revision dates does not suggest 
that there would be any last moment trading to secure the place in the shareholders’ nomination 
board among the sample firms. Rather the changes of nominators are due to ownership changes 
earlier on the year. Hence, even though there exist some evidence against the null hypothesis, 
there are no hints that the event day sample abnormal returns would be caused by the 
competition for the nomination rights. More likely, the noise in the data causes the event day 
sample abnormal return and therefore the null hypothesis should not be rejected. 
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8. Conclusions 
This study contributes to the field of corporate governance academic research by examining a 
unique corporate governance mechanism, the shareholders’ nomination boards. It is the first 
comprehensive study of the shareholders’ nomination boards in Finland, even though the 
corporate governance method has been in use for over a decade. Additionally, the thesis 
evaluates whether changes in the nominators of shareholders’ nomination board have an effect 
on the changes of the following board members. Finally, a study about the nomination practices 
and abnormal returns around the holdings revision date is conducted.  
As a pioneering study, this thesis gives the first detailed description about the shareholders’ 
nomination boards in Finland. The corporate governance model has existed since 2004, and at 
the end of 2016, already 41 companies (37 of them follow the Finnish Corporate Governance 
Code) had adopted it. The recent two changes in the Finnish Corporate Governance Code have 
been key factors driving the implementation of shareholders’ nomination boards, especially 
among smaller and non-government owned companies. The firms that use shareholders’ 
nomination board are very different in size and come from various industries. A shared feature 
of these companies is highly concentrated ownership among the largest owners, the largest three 
shareholders own on average 37% of all the votes. Similarly, the nomination power is 
concentrated to the hands of few since the three largest nominators; Keskinäinen 
Eläkevakuutusyhtiö Ilmarinen, Finnish Government, and Keskinäinen Työeläkevakuutusyhtiö 
Varma, have chosen more than half of all the nominees in the past. The largest ten nominators 
measured by all-time nomination count consist of four pension funds, three private investment 
groups, the investment funds of Nordea Bank and OP Group, as well as the Finnish 
Government. 
Additionally, the results from the tests about nominator changes effect on the subsequent board 
member changes indicate that nomination boards work as intended. Since the relationship is 
positive and statistically significant the largest shareholders’, as nominees of the nominators, 
do actually have authority over the company management. Even though the power is indirect, 
through the board member election process, it still has a significant role in the corporate 
governance. 
The empirical research questions were motivated by Carlsson (2007). In his paper, Carlsson 
examined shareholders’ nomination boards, or “valberedningar” in Sweden, where majority of 
the companies has implemented them, and some short-term activist investors have exploited 
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the nomination power to make quick profits. To find out whether evidences about the ‘hit-and-
run’ philosophy exist in Finland, the abnormal returns around the holdings revision dates were 
studied. The empirical study consist of four testable hypothesis. The first hypothesis tests for 
the positive abnormal returns before the holdings revision dates in general. In the second 
hypothesis, the aim is to examine, whether a change in the shareholders’ nomination board 
would lead to abnormal returns, while the third hypothesis tests whether the ownership structure 
has an effect on the results. Finally, the last hypothesis is a combination of the second and third 
hypothesis, testing their joint effect.  
The results are a relief since none of the tests indicates that shareholders’ nomination boards 
would be exploited as a loophole for short-term gains in Finland. There is no evidence against 
the first three hypotheses, and they all remain valid. In the fourth hypothesis test, the results 
were inconsistent due to the statistically significant positive event day abnormal. A further 
analysis of the ownership changes ruled out the possibility that the inconsistent results would 
be caused by the largest shareholders’ last minute trading.  
Another interesting finding of the thesis is that firms with shareholders’ nomination board 
appear to produce negative cumulative abnormal returns around the holdings revision date in 
the medium-term. The result is counterintuitive since the negative cumulative abnormal returns 
become statistically significant even before the holdings revision dates, in some of the tests, 
indicating that the shareholders are selling more shares just before the nomination board places 
are determined. One plausible explanation might be the highly concentrated ownership among 
the companies with shareholders nomination board, leading to a situation where the minority 
shareholders might not care at all about the shareholders’ nomination board places in their 
investment decisions. 
Further research about the shareholders’ nomination boards should be conducted, as the method 
has solidified its stance among the listed companies in Finland. The effect of obtaining the 
corporate governance method to firm profitability or shareholder returns opens an interesting 
field for further investigations. In addition, the relationship between different nomination 
methods and the board diversity as well as turnover is another avenue for the future studies. 
Finally, comparison between board nominations that are prepared by shareholders and 
nominations that are prepared by a subcommittee of a board offers many fruitful opportunities 
for future studies.  
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